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I have no basis for viewing [section 2] as constitutionally 
suspect and I don’t. If an issue were to arise before the Su-
preme Court or before the Court of Appeals, if I head back 
there, I would consider that issue with an open mind in light 
of the arguments. I’ve got no basis for viewing it as constitu-
tionally suspect today and I’m not aware that it’s been chal-
lenged in that respect since it was enacted. It may have been, 
but as I say, I’m not aware of it.1
— John G. Roberts, Jr. 
                                                                                                                    
 *. Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington. B.A., 1990, 
J.D., 1997, Ph.D., Political Science, 2001, University of Michigan; LL.M., 2002, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
 1. Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., of Maryland, to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 317 (2005) (statement 
of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States).  
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The starting point of the analysis [was] Supreme Court  
cases, and the new issue [was] presumptively decided  
according to the logic that those cases expressed, with no  
regard for how far that logic, thus extended, has distanced us 
from the original text and understanding. Worse still, however, 
it is known and understood that if that logic fails to produce 
what in the view of the current Supreme Court is the desirable
result for the case at hand, then, like good common-law judges, 
the Court will distinguish its precedents, or narrow them, or if 
all else fails overrule them, in order that the Constitution might 
mean what it ought to mean.2
— Antonin Scalia 
I.   INTRODUCTION
 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is once again at the center of our 
long-standing debate over our historical commitment to the principle 
of political equality. This is a debate about both the scope of congres-
sional power under the Reconstruction Amendments and contested 
substantive questions about how to best protect the right to vote.3
These are two distinct, yet familiar, strands to students of politics 
and constitutional law.  
 On the question of congressional powers, commentators query the 
need for congressional findings, the congruence and proportionality 
of the statute vis-à-vis the perceived harm, and whether the statute 
under review seeks to remedy a constitutional violation (as opposed 
to defining the harm itself).4 These are not new questions; they date 
back to the genesis of the Act, particularly the issue of findings. As 
Attorney General Katzenbach remarked in response to a question 
from Senator Ervin over the scope of congressional powers to “annul” 
any state law of its choosing: “I would think it is a terrible mistake, 
Senator, to think that Congress can just [enact appropriate legisla-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment] without findings of some 
                                                                                                                    
 2. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
3, 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 3. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Ex-
tend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2007); Nathaniel Persily, The 
Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174 (2007). 
 4. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew Preclearance Provisions, in
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 81, 85-88 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006). The 
cases that form the “New Federalism” jurisprudence include United States v. Georgia, 546 
U.S. 151 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nevada Department of Human Re-
sources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Flor-
ida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997); and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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kind . . . . We put those into the record.”5 The issue of findings was 
also at the center of the debate among the Justices over the constitu-
tionality of the Act.6
 On the substantive debate at the heart of the modern Voting 
Rights Act, the questions are far more contested and elusive. For ex-
ample, should Black and Latino communities demand the creation of 
majority-minority districts in order to ensure the election of repre-
sentatives of their choice?7 Or is it a more sensible strategy to insist 
on the creation of coalitional districts, where voters of color seek 
common ground with like-minded voters over their candidates of 
choice, or even influence districts, where voters of color play an im-
portant—yet not controlling—role in the election?8 In specific refer-
ence to some of the most important aspects of the Voting Rights Act, 
this is a debate about how to best operationalize the original promise 
of the Act9 and whether such promise remains relevant in light of 
changed—and clearly improved—circumstances.10 Or, more suc-
cinctly: what is the best way to maximize the electoral power of vot-
ers of color?  
 Overwhelming congressional majorities recently took sides in this 
debate, with the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott 
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 
2006.11 The results were both predictable and disappointing. Predic-
tability stemmed from the debate over congressional powers, as 
members of Congress and myriad witnesses highlighted the need for 
detailed congressional findings in support of the extension, and dis-
                                                                                                                    
 5. Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong. 100 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 6. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the 
Future of the Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 104-15 (2007).  
 7. See generally DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997). 
 8. See generally DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1997); Charles Cameron et al., 
Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?,
90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794 (1996). 
 9. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK
INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993); ABIGAIL 
M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING 
RIGHTS (1987). 
 10. See Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights 
Act: How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
385, 388-400 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,  
188-96 (2005). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81 (2006) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (Supp. 2007)). 
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cussions often looked ahead to what the Roberts Court might do 
when confronted with a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Act.12 Disappointment followed from the resolution of the substantive 
questions, as Congress did not venture far from its old script, choos-
ing only to extend the Act’s coverage formula for another twenty-five 
years while correcting some Supreme Court interpretations of the 
Act it deemed contrary to its wishes for the statute.13
 The next phase of this debate is now underway in both the blogos-
phere and the pages of the law reviews. These efforts are similarly 
predictable. In the face of a recently amended statute, legal scholars 
are busy doing what they have always done: making sense of the new 
language of the statute while also examining whether the work of 
Congress remains within established constitutional parameters. 
These are important questions in their own right and this Article 
does not intend to suggest otherwise. These are the micro-questions 
whose answers collectively give shape to the Act—the proverbial 
trees within a larger and much more important forest. The debate 
over the Act has largely focused on these questions. 
 But the Voting Rights Act is no ordinary statute, and to treat it as 
such is to miss the real lessons and insights of the Act. As enacted in 
1965, the Act’s sternest provisions—or what the Court termed “a 
complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting 
discrimination has been most flagrant”14—would expire after five 
years. This need for periodic reassessment and reauthorization has 
provided Congress with a built-in opportunity to examine the Court’s 
interpretations of the statute. Per its own extensions, Congress has 
had four such opportunities to correct judicial interpretations or to 
amend the language of the Act to better reflect the needs and elec-
toral problems of the present. In turn, the history of the Act provides 
scholars with fertile ground for examining the work of Congress and 
its interactions with the Supreme Court and the executive branch. 
These are the macro-questions—the forest itself. This is a far more 
important and intriguing feature of the debate over the Voting 
Rights Act. Before turning to questions of statutory interpretation 
and constitutional law, we must first tend to the first-order institu-
tional question: what is the Court’s disposition toward the Act and 
toward Congress and the executive branch? The existing scholarship 
neglects this question and fails to tap into the real insights of the Act 
                                                                                                                    
 12. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act: An Examination of the Scope and Criteria for Cover-
age Under the Special Provisions of the Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5-6, 32 (2005). 
 13. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, On the Renewal of Section 5 of 
the VRA: Why Congress Failed Voters of Color, in MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT: FEDERAL
ELECTION LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 37 (Andrew Rachlin ed., 2006). 
 14. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966). 
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and the distinct interaction between the Court, Congress, and the 
executive branch.15
 For example, anyone who reads the debate over the constitutio-
nality of the Act must come away with the impression that the ques-
tion for the future is whether the Act comports any longer with the 
“congruence and proportionality” test established in City of Boerne.16
In response to this question, leading voices in this debate parse 
through past opinions looking for relevant and seemingly controlling 
passages.17 And yet, from the moment it first confronted the constitu-
tionality of the Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,18 the Court has 
blindly deferred to the work of Congress, unwilling to subject this 
important statute to any meaningful scrutiny.19 The question for the 
future—I suggest this is the only question—is whether such defe-
rence will continue.20 This is not a question that traditional tools of 
constitutional interpretation can answer. 
 In contrast, this posture of deference for questions of constitutional 
law differs greatly from the Court’s posture when interpreting the lan-
guage of the statute. This is an area where the Court defers to no one, 
even when the text of the statute or the clear intent of Congress de-
mands a different outcome.21 In turn, Congress seldom responds to the 
                                                                                                                    
 15. For an important exception, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667 (2008). 
 16. 521 U.S. 507, 533-36 (1997). 
 17. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 3; Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why 
Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent 
and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 87-94 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: De-
fending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349, 354-57 (2006). 
 18. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 19. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1999); City of Rome v. Unit-
ed States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970). 
 20. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 122. 
 21. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. 
(Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 139-41 (1976); 
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507 and 
Title IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong. 5 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings] (“This case [Gaston 
County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969)] is yet another example of the Court’s habit 
of redoing the work of Congress to conform with its own notions of desirable legislation.”) 
(statement of Sen. Ervin). For some of the cases, see Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 320; 
Beer, 425 U.S. at 140; Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews,
400 U.S. 379 (1971).  
 For criticisms of the Court’s approach in particular cases, see, for example, Holder v. 
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 895-97 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 935, in which Justice 
Thomas stated the following: “Not surprisingly, the legislative history relied upon in Allen
also displayed the typical flaws that one might expect—it was hardly unequivocal”; Beer,
425 U.S. at 146 (Marshall, J., dissenting), in which Justice Marshall contended that “the 
congressional purposes in § 5 are no longer served and the sacred guarantees of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments emerge badly battered”; and Allen v. State Board of 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 583, 585 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), in which Justice Harlan labeled Allen an “extremely broad construction of § 5,” and 
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Court’s aggressive and adventurous interpretations of the Act. The 
times when Congress does respond demand an explanation. 
 The recent case of NAMUDNO v. Holder,22 decided this past term, 
follows this established script. To the uncritical and ahistorical eye, 
this case reached a surprising result. But this would be a mistaken 
conclusion. This challenge to the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act offered a vehicle to the conservative Justices on the Court 
to bring about the fall of the Act once and for all. Judging from the 
oral argument, they were poised to do exactly that.23 It appeared that 
critics of the Act had finally secured five votes to strike down the sta-
tute. But this is something the Court has refused to do time and 
again, even at times when a majority seemed at hand. In the end, the 
Court dodged the constitutional question and decided the case on 
technical statutory grounds. On both accounts, the Justices placed 
themselves squarely within the history and tradition of the Act. On 
the constitutional question, the Court deferred to Congress as it has 
traditionally done; and on the statutory question, the Court offered a 
novel reading of the statutory language, grounded not on the text of 
the statute, the legislative history, or the intent or purpose of the leg-
islature, but on its views of what the statute must mean. Again, 
there is nothing new there. 
 In the wake of NAMUDNO, scholars will continue to focus on the 
micro-questions surrounding the Voting Rights Act while ignoring 
what is far and away the most important aspect of the Court’s han-
dling of the statute: why is the Court uncharacteristically deferential 
to Congress on the question of congressional powers, yet unduly ag-
gressive when interpreting the language of the statute? This is exact-
ly backwards. How to explain it? The real lessons and insights of the 
Act and its tumultuous history are found within this as-of-yet un-
examined paradox. 
 This Article examines this paradox in detail and offers two related 
conclusions. The first conclusion looks to the “living constitutional-
ism” debate and the role that the Court should play in updating the 
                                                                                                                    
complained that “the Court has now construed § 5 to require a revolutionary innovation in 
American government.” 
 22. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 23. See Adam Liptak, Skepticism at Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/us/30voting.html (“A central provision of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, designed to protect minorities in states with a history of dis-
crimination, is at substantial risk of being struck down as unconstitutional, judging from 
the questioning on Wednesday at the Supreme Court.”); see also Posting of David Gans to 
Balkinization, The Voting Rights Act, the Souter Vacancy, and the Future of the Supreme 
Court, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/voting-rights-act-souter-vacancy-and.html (May 
19, 2009, 15:45) (“Given the repeated hostile questioning by all the Court’s conservatives – 
except Justice Thomas who was characteristically silent – many commentators expect that 
the Court will strike down the extension of the pre-clearance requirement.”). 
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Constitution. Consider first the congressional debates in 1965 and 
the fact that Congress and the administration made clear throughout 
the hearings that they wished to take the substantive provisions of 
the Act as far as constitutionally permissible. The Warren Court un-
derstood the congressional intent behind the Act in this manner. Re-
latedly, this was also a time when the Court understood the Consti-
tution as granting Congress wide latitude to tackle the difficult ques-
tion of racial discrimination then gripping the nation. Taken togeth-
er, these understandings explain the Court’s expansive interpreta-
tions of the Act early on. The early cases were faithful expressions of 
congressional intent buttressed by an expansive understanding of 
constitutional power. 
 Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Court’s interpretations of the sta-
tute narrowed considerably. The change in the doctrine cannot be 
explained by pointing to the intent of Congress, which remained con-
sistent. Rather, this change can only be explained by the fact that 
constitutional meaning ebbs and flows with the times. This is not a 
static document by any means. More importantly, this argument un-
derscores the view that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, living 
constitutionalism is not reserved for the liberal Justices. 
 Second, this Article concludes that the Court, in line with ac-
counts of the Justices as strategic actors and “single-minded seekers 
of legal policy,”24 has played the leading role in delineating the subs-
tantive contours of the Voting Rights Act. The Act has served as es-
sentially a placeholder—a vague and forgiving statutory canvass 
susceptible to myriad interpretations—which in turn has afforded 
the Justices the means by which to interpret their policy views into 
the statute. And make no mistake, the Court has taken full advan-
tage of this aspect of the statute, offering readings of the relevant 
language that span the spectrum of interpretation, from strict tex-
tualist applications of the law to dynamic interpretations that would 
make Bill Eskridge blush. The lesson is clear: we should stop treat-
ing the Act as no more than a paint-by-numbers exercise, as a tech-
nical and mechanical application of preexisting norms to new facts. 
The history of the Act in court is far more interesting than that.  
 This Article examines this history in five Parts. Part II offers a 
primer on the Voting Rights Act, its history and raison d’être. The 
goal for this Part is quite modest in that it only seeks to provide 
much needed context and grounding for the larger argument. Parts 
III and IV explore the paradox at the heart of the Act. Part III focus-
es on the constitutional questions at the heart of the Act, while Part 
IV examines the Court’s interpretations of the statutory language. 
                                                                                                                    
 24. Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Mak-
ing, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325 (1992). 
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Taken together, these Parts tell a story where the Supreme Court 
aggressively regulates the contours of the Act, while Congress plays 
a secondary role. Part V discusses the recent NAMUDNO decision 
and situates it within the history of the Act in Court. Finally, Part VI 
discusses the two central lessons of the history of the Voting Rights 
Act in court. 
II.   THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: A PRIMER
 The Voting Rights Act was the fourth attempt by the federal gov-
ernment to narrow the deep chasm between the guarantees at the 
heart of the Fifteenth Amendment and the reality on the ground, 
where “legalisms, stratagems, trickery, and coercion”25 stood in the 
way of Black enfranchisement. The first three efforts, codified in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1957, 1960, and 1964, adopted what Attorney 
General Katzenbach termed “the alternative of litigation, of seeking 
solutions in our judicial system.”26 But these efforts fell woefully 
short, as any judicial victories, secured after lengthy and expensive 
efforts in court, were ultimately “tarnished by evasion, obstruction, 
delay, and disrespect.”27 As the Attorney General explained during 
his Senate testimony in 1965: 
Our experience in the voting area has been this, that no matter 
what is decided by courts, no matter what is passed by Congress in 
this respect, every single place in some States, the only way you 
can get compliance is to litigate and then that is defended, it is de-
fended up through every court procedure to the Supreme Court, no 
matter how clear and obvious the points, no matter how many 
times those same points have been decided, until you eventually 
get a decree.  
 Then the decree is examined carefully to see whether there is 
any way in which a certain practice not explicitly prohibited by the 
decree can be engaged in for the same discriminatory purposes. 
 When this is done, and you go back to court to get the judge to 
broaden the decree, his capacity and jurisdiction to do that is liti-
gated, then that is taken on appeal and that is taken to the Su-
preme Court.  
 When you run out of these things, the legislature enacts a new 
test and that has to be litigated and appealed and go to the Su-
preme Court.28
 A new approach was clearly needed, an approach that went 
“beyond the tortuous, often-ineffective pace of litigation.”29 “What is 
                                                                                                                    
 25. Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of 
Chairman Emanuel Celler, Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 26. Id. at 5 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 27. Id.
 28. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 41-42. 
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required,” Katzenbach told the House subcommittee, “is a systemat-
ic, automatic method to deal with discriminatory tests, with discri-
minatory testers, and with discriminatory threats.”30 In a nutshell: 
some jurisdictions could not be trusted to design fair and nonracially 
discriminatory registration tests, nor could they be trusted to enforce 
any such tests fairly, and simply taking such jurisdictions to court 
proved insufficient. The answer would be the Voting Rights Act  
of 1965.31
 Three features of the Act deserve particular mention. First, the 
Act provided for the appointment of federal examiners and registrars 
in order to ensure that eligible voters of color would be placed on the 
registration rolls and allowed to cast ballots.32 These provisions, 
coupled with the Act’s suspension of literacy tests for any jurisdiction 
covered under the Act’s trigger formula, were responsible for the ini-
tial surge in voting registration across the South.  
 Second, the Act adopted the aforementioned trigger formula for 
determining which jurisdictions would be covered under the special 
provisions of the Act.33 Under the formula, a jurisdiction would au-
tomatically fall within the coverage of the Act if it employed a litera-
cy test and either its turnout rate for the 1964 presidential election 
or its registration rate on November 1, 1964, was below fifty per-
cent.34 The formula initially brought within the purview of the Act 
the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Caro-
lina, and Virginia, as well as twenty-six counties in North Carolina. 
Of note, this coverage formula would be due to expire in 1970 (after 
which time, the covered states and counties were free to reinstitute 
their literacy tests).  
 Third, section 5 of the Act—which soon became known as the 
heart of the Act35—required a covered jurisdiction to submit any pro-
                                                                                                                    
 29. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 9. 
 30. Id.
 31. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
 32. Id. §§ 3, 8. 
 33. The special provisions of the bill were temporary in nature. Under section 4(b), a 
state would be covered under the Act if it used a literacy test as a prerequisite to vote and 
its voter registration on November 1, 1964, or its voter turnout rate on the 1964 Presiden-
tial election dipped below fifty percent. Those states caught under 4(b) of the Act would 
need to preclear any changes to their voting laws with a three judge District Court in the 
District of Columbia. See id. § 4. 
 34. Id. § 4(b). 
 35. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 
3247, and H.R. 3501 Before Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights, 94th Cong. 40 (1975) 
[hereinafter 1975 House Hearings] (statement of Chairman Flemming, U.S. Comm’n on 
Civil Rights) (contending that “[s]ection 5 of the Voting Rights Act . . . has become the cen-
terpiece of the act”); id. at 629 (statement of Armand Derfner) (testifying that “section 5 is 
in a sense a fulcrum of the act”); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
TEN YEARS AFTER, in Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, 
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posed change in “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure” to the Department of Justice or 
U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia for a determination 
that the change “does not have the purpose and will not have the ef-
fect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color.”36 In other words, section 5 embodied the lack of trust that 
made the Act a necessity. The solution itself was nothing short of 
radical and unorthodox. 
 For jurisdictions subject to section 5, traditional burdens and pre-
sumptions were turned on their head; in essence, their laws were 
considered unconstitutional unless and until the jurisdictions proved 
otherwise. And the burden of proof on this important point was on 
the jurisdictions themselves, not the government. This was crucial, 
because the jurisdictions must ultimately prove a negative—that 
their changes neither had the purpose nor would they have the effect 
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. 
Until they made this showing—that is, until they precleared their 
changes as demanded under section 5 of the Act—these select juris-
dictions as covered under section 4 of the Act could not implement 
their voting changes. 
III.   CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CONGRESSIONAL POWERS,
AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
 From the time the Johnson administration introduced the voting 
rights bill in Congress, two questions took center stage. The first was 
the question of whether Congress had the power under section 2 of 
the Fifteenth Amendment to enact the Voting Rights Act. This ques-
tion focused with particular care on the coverage formula and the 
preclearance requirement, as these aspects of the Act targeted specif-
ic jurisdictions in the South and, as such, evoked memories of Recon-
struction. The second was the necessary question of statutory con-
struction. For example, what qualifies as a “voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure”37 under 
section 5 of the Act? Also, how should one determine when a change 
does not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color? And further, is the purpose prong 
in any way related to the effect prong? Taken together, these ques-
tions would determine the effectiveness of the Act into the future, 
and as such they thrust the Supreme Court to the center of the de-
bate. The Court’s handling of these questions, the topic of the next 
                                                                                                                    
H.R. 3247 and H.R. 3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 969, 988 (1975).  
 36. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965). 
 35. Id.
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two Parts, raises one of the most interesting and important paradox-
es in modern constitutional law. But first, the next Section takes a 
look at the debate from the eyes of the critics of the bill in Congress.  
A.   The Act in Congress: Three Questions 
 The constitutional debate over the Voting Rights Act began as 
soon as the bill reached the appropriate House and Senate commit-
tees. And in these fora, the debate carried on as expected; critics of 
the Act marshaled all arguments, large and small, against the legis-
lation. This was a real debate, and it highlighted the momentousness 
of this occasion and the degree to which the bill pushed awfully hard 
at myriad constitutional norms. The Constitution was in the minds of 
all the participants, many of whom often cited past Supreme Court 
opinions in support of their positions.38 This is where critics of the 
legislation waged their strongest battle, over the constitutionality of 
the bill. The Senate hearings provided particularly fertile ground for 
these arguments, under the leadership of Senator Eastman of Mis-
sissippi and Senator Ervin of North Carolina. 
 Critics of the Act in Congress argued that the proposed legislation 
would “destroy” the Constitution39 and would require “throwing the 
Constitution of your country out the window.”40 “Nobody,” according 
to Judge Perez, representing the Governor of Louisiana, “is  
dumb enough not to understand that.”41 These arguments took vari-
ous forms.  
                                                                                                                    
 38. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 112 (statement of Nicholas Kat-
zenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“Congressman, an awful lot of our constitutional 
arguments were made, as I am sure you recall, with respect to the 1964 act. I think they 
were sincerely made and we were able to persuade nine justices of the Supreme Court as to 
our position and the constitutionality of that bill.”); see also id. at 385 (statement of Joseph 
Rauh, counsel for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (“I do not even consider this 
a close question because I think the people who are talking about it do not reckon with the 
fact that the Supreme Court has never in recent history questioned Congress [sic] judg-
ment in this area.”). Some critics of the legislation grudgingly conceded this point. See id.
at 626 (statement of Rep. John Dowdy) (“Possibly in these days it is vain to advance consti-
tutional questions, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has assumed the power to 
amend the Constitution by judicial decree, and the Executive is here demanding that Con-
gress amend it by legislative act, wholly ignoring the plain provisions of that Constitution . . . .”). 
 39. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 77 (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
 40. Id. at 155 (statement of Sen. James O. Eastland, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary); see id. at 57-63 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (making a constitutional argument 
against the bill while disagreeing with a recent Supreme Court case); id. at 548 (statement 
of Judge L.H. Perez, representing Gov. John J. McKeithen of La.) (“You are violating the 
Constitution and your sworn duty to uphold the Constitution, and the provisions are too 
plain and too clear. Nobody is dumb enough not to understand that.”); id. at 615 (state-
ment of Paul Rodgers, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen. of Ga.) (arguing that the bill is unconstitu-
tional). To be fair, supporters of the legislation also worried abut the constitutionality of 
the bill. See, e.g., id. at 140 (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart) (asking the Attorney General 
about the constitutionality of the bill and the Solicitor General’s views). 
41. Id. at 548. 
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1.   A Question of Congressional Powers 
 A leading criticism attacked the classifications under the Act as 
an unreasonable exercise of congressional power under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.42 This was a criticism of the coverage formula and the 
drafters’ decision to draw its line of inclusion at fifty percent voting 
turnout or registration rates and the existence of a literacy test. Time 
and again, critics complained that the coverage formula was “a cock-
eyed formula,”43 “arbitrary,”44 and lacking in “logic,”45 “rhyme and 
reason.”46 The criticism had two components. First, some critics com-
plained that the formula was overinclusive, as it covered some juris-
dictions that were free of racial discrimination in voting47 and could 
only be understood as an effort to punish the Southern states.48 How 
could Congress justify the inclusion of Louisiana and some North 
Carolina counties under the Act, for example, when the state of Tex-
as and some counties in New York, neither of which came within the 
purview of the trigger formula, had lower voting turnout rates during 
the 1964 presidential election?49
 Second, and in the words of Representative Cramer: “What con-
stitutional basis is there for that where the effect of it is obviously to 
strike down the State’s constitutional rights to fix voter qualifica-
                                                                                                                    
 42. See id. at 139 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“I have a high respect for your opinion, 
but that is about the most unreasonable classification ever made, in my judgment . . . .”); 
id. at 50 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“I have difficulty understanding why the Department of 
Justice would draw up such an unreasonable bill as this.”). 
 43. Id. at 199, 234, 272, 283 (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
 44. Id. at 265 (statement of Att’y Bloch); see id. at 281 (“The inference it seeks to draw 
is purely arbitrary; there is no rational relation to the premise, even if it be a fact, and the 
ultimate fact in issue . . . .”). 
 45. Id. at 647 (statement of James J. Kilpatrick, Vice Chairman, Va. Comm. on Con-
stitutional Gov’t); see id. at 33 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“So I say, Mr. Attorney General, 
that I do not think there is necessarily any logical connection between the assumption 
based on these percentages and the presumption that there was a violation of the 14th 
Amendment.”). 
 46. Id. at 234 (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
 47. Senator Ervin made this point innumerable times with respect to the counties in 
North Carolina that would come under the coverage formula. See, e.g., id. at 769 (“I envy 
people sometimes who worry about sins far away from home because it acts as an opiate 
and blinds them to conditions existing on their own doorstep. It is a whole lot easier to try 
to reform people far away from home than it is to reform your own constituents.”). 
 48. See id. at 564 (statement of Judge Perez) (labeling covered jurisdictions under the 
formula “conquered provinces”); id. at 625 (statement of Sen. John J. Sparkman) (“It is a 
harsh bill, designed to punish the South.”); id. at 292 (statement of Att’y Bloch) (comparing 
the bill to a lynching of the states). Attorney General Katzenbach and Senator Dirksen re-
sponded that the formula was neutral on its face and applied to all fifty states. See, e.g., id.
at 171 (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (“And it applies to all of the 50 States of the Union, 
where the right to vote is abridged or denied.”). 
 49. See id. at 241. Chairman Eastland asked why Texas would not come under the 
coverage formula and whether that was done intentionally. See id. at 164 (“Was not one of 
your big hassles to plan to keep Texas out of this bill? Is that not the reason that you have 
this test or device in here, to keep Texas out?”). Senator Ervin brought up the comparison 
with Texas as well. See id. at 722. 
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tions in areas where no discrimination has been found to exist?”50
This point had a great deal of force. Recall that under the trigger 
provision, a state or political subdivision would come under the pur-
view of the Act if it made use of a literacy test and less than fifty per-
cent of its voters were registered on November 1, 1964, or its voter 
turnout dipped under fifty percent for the 1964 Presidential election. 
Of necessity, this would mean that some jurisdictions that were free 
of discrimination would come under the provisions of the bill; that is, 
some jurisdictions would be deprived of their constitutional right to 
set voter qualifications.51 And yet, if the Fifteenth Amendment pro-
scribes racial discrimination in voting, and Congress is seeking to en-
force this amendment by appropriate legislation, how could Congress 
designate as covered jurisdictions areas with no proven instances of 
such discrimination?  
 As a general matter, Attorney General Katzenbach offered that 
the proposed bill was a constitutional means of enforcing the com-
mands of the Fifteenth Amendment. In response to the critique of the 
proposed coverage formula, he contended that the bill set up working 
categories under which it classified the states in accordance to the 
formula, and “[g]iven a valid factual premise—as we have it here—it 
is for Congress to set the boundaries. That is essentially a legislative 
function which the courts do not and cannot quibble about.”52 This 
was a basic question of constitutional authority, which he argued the 
Fifteenth Amendment conferred upon Congress.  
 The Attorney General conceded that the states had a constitu-
tional right to set their own voting qualifications as they saw fit. This 
was Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,53 a case that 
critics of the legislation cited incessantly54 and which explained that 
“[t]he States have long been held to have broad powers to determine 
the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised ab-
sent of course the discrimination which the Constitution con-
                                                                                                                    
 50. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 88.  
 51. See id. at 112 (statement of Rep. Ashmore) (“I am convinced that there is a serious 
question of States’ rights . . . .”); id. at 601 (statement of Daniel McLeod, Att’y Gen. of S.C.) 
(“[Y]ou are infringing upon and usurping the State rights when you impose Federal deter-
mination of voting qualifications under the 15th amendment.”); id. at 755 (statement of 
Rep. Basil L. Whitener) (contending that the legislation is beyond constitutional authority, 
as the states have the right to set voter qualifications); 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 
5, at 309 (statement of Att’y Bloch) (branding the Act a “conspiracy to destroy our State 
laws for voter qualifications”); id. at 705 (statement of Robert Y. Button, Att’y Gen. of Va.) 
(complaining that the bill is a sham and “merely one step in a scheme for ultimate Federal 
control of the conduct of all State and local elections”). 
 52. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 14. 
 53. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 54. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 113 (statement of Rep. Ashmore); 
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 208 (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
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demns.”55 But Lassiter did not stop there, since, “[o]f course, a litera-
cy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate that discrimi-
nation which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot.”56
And so the Attorney General concluded: 
The constitutional rule is clear: So long as State laws or practices 
erecting voting qualifications for non-Federal elections do not run 
afoul of the 14th or 15th amendments, they stand undisturbed. 
But when State power is abused—as it plainly is in the areas af-
fected by the present bill—there is no magic in the words “voting 
qualification.”57
 The right of states to set their voting qualifications was not abso-
lute; it went only as far as the commands of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments began. A state may not violate these commands 
under the guise of erecting “voting qualification[s].” 
 This argument failed to respond to Congressman Cramer’s power-
ful constitutional objection to the inclusion of nondiscriminatory ju-
risdictions within the coverage of the Act. But the Attorney General 
felt quite confident on this score as well. As he explained, those areas 
free of discrimination within a larger discriminatory jurisdiction are 
exceptions and “cannot be used as a proper support for saying . . . you 
can’t regulate other units within the State or the State as a whole.”58
After all, he argued elsewhere, “the fact that you are not cutting with 
absolute surgical skill and may pick up some other area is not of vital 
importance and is constitutionally irrelevant.”59 On this point, he felt 
so confident about the administration’s course of action and the con-
stitutionality of the bill that he did not “even see the constitutional 
difficulty.”60 So long as Congress acted reasonably, the legislation 
would bear scrutiny. And to his mind, “all [the bill] is doing is taking 
reasonable and appropriate steps to enforce the 15th Amendment.”61
2.   A Question of Constitutional Proscriptions 
 A second criticism contended that the legislation was both a bill of 
attainder and an ex post facto law, in violation of Article I, section 
9.62 According to Senator Ervin, an ex post facto law is a law that 
“imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the 
time of commitment or imposes additional punishment to that pre-
scribed or changes the rule of evidence by which less or different tes-
                                                                                                                    
 55. Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 50-51 (citations omitted).  
 56. Id. at 53. 
 57. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 15. 
 58. Id.
 59. Id. at 82. 
 60. Id. at 88. 
 61. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 89. 
 62. See id. at 62-63. 
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timony is sufficient to convict than was then required.”63 Under this 
definition, the proposed bill was an ex post facto law, since “a State 
or political subdivision was not subjected to the punishment of being 
deprived of their power to prescribe and administer literacy tests by 
the fact that less than 50 percent of their people of voting age failed 
to vote in the presidential election of 1964.”64 Senator Ervin similarly 
argued that the proposed legislation was 
a bill of attainder as it deprives the States, certain States and cer-
tain counties of certain States which are defined in terms by the 
act itself, and election officials in those States, and counties, of cer-
tain powers vested in the States and political subdivisions of the 
States. It does this without a judicial trial, and furthermore, it 
does this on the basis of a fact completed in the past.65
 Attorney General Katzenbach disagreed with both criticisms. On 
the first, he argued that “where the Congress is given an express 
power to implement a provision of the Constitution it may adopt any 
reasonable and appropriate means for doing it.”66 Attorney General 
Katzenbach also disagreed that this was either a bill of attainder or 
an ex post facto law, as the bill “is not a punishment.”67
3.   A Question of States’ Rights 
 Finally, the critics took the banner of states’ rights and com-
plained that “[y]ou would just as well wipe out your State lines if this 
theory of legislation is held constitutional.”68 In other words, if  
Congress could enact such drastic measures into law, what couldn’t 
Congress do? Or as Senator Stennis complained, passage of the Act 
“sets a precedent for anything that anybody might want, a majority 
of the Congress or any President might want at any given time on 
any subject.”69
 These were serious arguments against the constitutionality of the 
bill, raising difficult questions under existing law. At the end of three 
days of heavy questioning at the hands of Senator Ervin, Attorney 
General Katzenbach told the committee that he “ha[d] confidence in 
the constitutionality of the bill.”70 Once the President signed the bill 
into law on August 6th, the national focus shifted to the Supreme 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Id.
 64. Id.
 65. Id. at 64-65. 
 66. Id. at 88; see also id. at 674 (statement of Thomas Watkins, representing the Gov. 
of Miss.). 
 67. Id. at 63. 
 68. Id. at 293 (statement of Att’y Bloch); see id. at 309 (statement of Judge Perez) 
(branding the Act a “conspiracy to destroy our State laws for voter qualification”). 
 69. Id. at 831. 
 70. Id. at 249. 
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Court and its imminent handling of these complex constitutional is-
sues. The next Section shifts its focus to the Court as well.  
B.   The Act in Court 
 The Supreme Court heard arguments on the constitutionality of 
the statute a scant five months after its passage, and it issued an 
opinion seven weeks later.71 This was the last stand of critics of the 
bill, and they felt confident about their position. To some, “the bill 
[was] based on emotionalism and is shot through with weaknesses 
which . . . the Supreme Court could [not] possibly uphold”;72 and oth-
ers, while professing a “strong enough faith in the intellectual hones-
ty of the members of that Court, . . . do not believe they would for 1 
minute permit this unconstitutional act to be upheld.”73 But some 
critics were not quite as optimistic. According to James Kilpatrick, 
then vice chairman of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional 
Government: “it is . . . unfortunate that members of the Supreme 
Court of the United States appeared—turned up to here [sic] the 
President’s message and appeared on the television cameras ap-
plauding. I think this is a violation of the separation of powers of the 
United States and creates imbalances.”74
 This Section examines the history of the Voting Rights Act in 
court. This is a story replete with familiar themes. In fact, the most 
intriguing aspect of the Court’s handling of the Voting Rights Act is 
how the Justices continue to deploy the same arguments either in de-
fense of or against the constitutionality of the Act. For the Court, this 
is a debate about judicial findings and the pursuit of legitimate state 
interests; in contrast, the dissenting Justices often decry the Court’s 
abdication of its long-established responsibility as constitutional in-
terpreter. As we look to the future of the Act and the looming chal-
lenge to its constitutionality, the only question left is whether the 
Court will stick to its old script. 
1.   Findings, Rationality, and the Court as Partner: The 
Katzenbach Cases 
 Think for a moment about the challenge facing the Justices as 
they debated the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. If the de-
bate in Congress was any indication, this would not be an easy case. 
Congress and the administration pushed as hard as they could 
against established constitutional norms, and it was now up to the 
Court to determine whether they had pushed too hard. Were the 
                                                                                                                    
 71. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 301 (1966). 
 72. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 629 (statement of Sen. Sparkman). 
 73. Id. at 678 (statement of Thomas Watkins, representing the Gov. of Miss.). 
 74. Id. at 642. 
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Court inclined to strike down the Act as outside the powers of Con-
gress, it had many arguments with which to do so. But the question 
for the Court was not whether the Act was beyond the powers of 
Congress; rather, the question was whether the Justices had the will 
to side against overwhelming congressional majorities and the na-
tional mood. This is not something that the Court does very often.75
 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,76 the Court acknowledged that 
the Act established “stringent new remedies”77 and that some of its 
provisions were “inventive”78 and “uncommon.”79 To suggest other-
wise would be foolish. Yet the Court recognized that “exceptional 
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropri-
ate.”80 And further, Congress was not acting rashly and hastily, but 
rather it “explored with great care the problem of racial discrimina-
tion in voting.”81
 Thus, on the record before it, the Court concluded that the means 
used by Congress were a legitimate, permissible response to the prob-
lem at hand.82 “After enduring nearly a century of systematic resis-
tance to the Fifteenth Amendment,” the Court explained in a mo-
ment of great candor, “Congress might well decide to shift the advan-
tage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its vic-
tims.”83 Deference to Congress was the order of the day. 
 A cursory reading of the Court’s opinion discloses an obvious af-
finity with the government’s position during the congressional hear-
ings, a fact that the Court did not attempt to hide. The arguments 
                                                                                                                    
75. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563 (2001); see 
also THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); ROBERT G.
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 230 (3rd ed. 2000); Richard Funston, The 
Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 807 (1975). 
76. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
77. Id. at 308. 
78. Id. at 327. 
79. Id. at 334. 
80. Id.
 81. Id. at 308. The critics disagreed with this point, to be sure, and vehemently so. See
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 54 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“Congress has rarely 
been called upon to enact a law which bears on its face the marks of having been written in 
such haste as this one.”); id. at 616 (statement of Paul Rodgers, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gener-
al of State of Ga.) (“The bill was rather hazily drawn and I think it is obvious . . . .”); see al-
so 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 623 (statement of former Rep. Watson) (“All of 
us know, Mr. Chairman, that the support of this measure is primarily the result of mass 
hysteria created and nurtured by the national press.”). While Senator Ervin repeated this 
complaint often, see 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 54, 235, 593, the Attorney Gen-
eral denied it. See id. at 54 (“It wasn’t written in all that haste. There were a lot of revi-
sions that were made, as I think is true of almost every law that is enacted, that there are 
changes made in committee, changes made up to the last minute. Just because changes are 
made, just before the bill is reported, you don’t say that the bill was drafted in haste.”). 
82. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 334.
83. Id. at 328 (emphasis added). 
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were familiar ones. The coverage formula, and particularly its re-
liance on test and devices and turnout and registration rates, was ra-
tional on its face and as applied to the covered states. The use of test 
and devices needed little explanation, since these tests had a long 
and settled historical pedigree “as a tool for perpetrating the evil.”84
The use of voter turnout rates was similarly “obvious” and legitimate, 
as widespread efforts to disenfranchise voters “must inevitably” lead 
to low voting rates.85 The Court also was unimpressed by the fact 
that the formula did not include some jurisdictions for which evi-
dence of voting discrimination exists. Congress need not handle all 
aspects of a problem in the same way, the Court explained, “so long 
as the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical experience.”86
More tellingly for the Court, the record put together by Congress did 
not reveal any state or political subdivision exempted by the coverage 
formula yet guilty of racial discrimination through the use of tests 
and devices. While the critics complained that this confirmed the dis-
criminatory nature of the formula as applied against the Southern 
states, the Court concluded that “[t]his fact confirms the rationality 
of the formula.”87
 The Court disposed of any and all arguments similarly. For ex-
ample, to the argument that the bailout provision was a nullity and 
imposed an impossible burden on the covered states, the Court of-
fered the testimony of the Attorney General that the burden would be 
no more than the submission of affidavits from voting officials.88 Si-
milarly, the five-year suspension of literacy tests “was a legitimate 
response to the problem” evidenced by the record and “for which 
there is ample precedent in Fifteenth Amendment cases.”89 As to the 
criticism that the role assigned to the District Court in D.C. under 
section 5 would amount to the authorization of advisory opinions in 
violation of Article III, it is not so. This is because a covered state 
wishing to amend its voting laws had a “controversy” with the federal 
government, and a court’s determination that the voting change in 
question complied with the Act was an appropriate judicial remedy.90
 The ease with which the Court set aside the constitutional chal-
lenges posed by the Voting Rights Act should not be surprising. Con-
gress was finally confronting a national disgrace, and the Court 
would not stand in the way of a solution. To the Court, the Act was 
                                                                                                                    
84. Id. at 330. 
85. Id.
 86. Id. at 331 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Ry. 
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)). 
 87. Id.
 88. See id. at 332. 
 89. Id. at 334. 
 90. See id. at 335. 
2009] PARADOXICAL CASE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 715 
well within past exercises of congressional powers. But the real story 
of the case is how willing the Justices were in giving Congress much-
needed room to handle this problem. The Court did not only defer to 
Congress; to some, it abdicated. And, this would not be the last time. 
 If any doubt remained about the Court’s posture of deference, a 
more difficult constitutional challenge lay in the wings. Section 4(e) 
of the Act provided that no person who has completed a sixth grade 
education in a school accredited by the commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
shall be denied the right to vote on account of an inability to read or 
write English.91 This provision ran into direct conflict with the recent 
precedent established by Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of 
Elections,92 a case decided a scant six years earlier, where the Court 
turned down a facial challenge to literacy tests. If Lassiter stood for 
the proposition that literacy tests were legitimate exercises of state 
authority absent the intent to discriminate on racial grounds, could 
Congress strike down a state literacy test devoid of any indicia of ra-
cial intent?  
 The Court answered this question in Katzenbach v. Morgan.93 In 
an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court explained that 
the question was not whether application of the literacy requirement 
violated the equal protection clause. Rather, the question in Morgan
was whether section 4(e) was “ ‘appropriate legislation’ to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause.”94 The Court unsurprisingly concluded that 
it was, while asserting in a controversial footnote that “Congress’ 
power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guar-
antees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, 
abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”95
 As in South Carolina, the story in Morgan was one of clear and 
unbridled deference to the wishes of Congress. To even call it low-
level review would be misleading, for that implies that there was any 
review at all. There was not. Congress made all the needed weighing 
and balancing, answered all the questions, and reached all the 
needed conclusions. This was enough for the Court. The Justices 
were not interested in reviewing how Congress resolved these various 
questions; all it needed was to “perceive a basis upon which the Con-
gress might resolve the conflict as it did.”96
 The Morgan case must be understood for what it was: a moment 
in time when the Court ceded some of its traditional power to define 
the substantive scope of the Constitution to Congress and its own 
                                                                                                                    
 91. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965).  
 92. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 93. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 94. Id. at 651. 
 95. Id. at 651 n.10. 
 96. Id. at 653. 
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power to enforce the Constitution. Under existing doctrine, that is, 
the state literacy test was neither irrational nor arbitrary, and thus 
constitutional; yet Congress declared it unconstitutional all the same, 
and by a mere “ipse dixit,” no less.97 The Court did not even demand a 
factual record to support the congressional conclusion. This was a 
question, Justice Harlan complained in dissent, “for the judicial 
branch ultimately to determine.”98 But the Court was not persuaded 
and happily ceded ground to Congress to carry on its important work. 
Or, as former Solicitor General Cox testified during the 1969 Senate 
hearings, Morgan was “a token of congressional supremacy.”99
2.   Too Much of a Good Thing: Literacy Tests and Oregon v. 
Mitchell 
 This forgiving and deferential posture of the Court to the Act con-
tinued through the years. In Oregon v. Mitchell, for example, the 
Court unanimously upheld a five-year nationwide ban on literacy 
tests.100 On its face, this ban posed a difficult question of constitu-
tional law, maybe even an insurmountable one. It was one thing to 
ban literacy tests within jurisdictions guilty of racial discrimination, 
as supported by extensive congressional findings. (This was South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach.) It would be another to ban these literacy 
tests across all fifty states, in the absence of similar findings for all 
affected jurisdictions.  
 Yet the Court hardly flinched. Four Justices—Black, Stewart, 
Burger, and Blackmun—saw the problem of literacy and voting as a 
national problem and welcomed the nationwide extension as recogni-
tion of this fact.101 Congressional findings fully supported this conclu-
sion. As Justice Black explained, Congress had evidence that literacy 
tests had long been used to discriminate and disenfranchise voters.102
Congress also had evidence of the history of discriminatory educa-
tional opportunities across the nation.103 Justice Stewart similarly 
concluded that Congress had enough evidence from the 1965 hear-
ings to reach this conclusion.104
 The remaining Justices took a similarly deferential posture. For 
Justice Douglas, the Court in Morgan “traveled most of the distance 
                                                                                                                    
 97. Id. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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needed to sustain this Act,”105 and in light of the legislative history, 
“we certainly cannot say that the means used were inappropriate.”106
Justice Harlan conceded that he might have preferred a less aggres-
sive approach in this “delicate area,” yet “the choice which Congress 
made was within the range of the reasonable.”107 And Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, concluded that “there is 
no question but that Congress could legitimately have concluded that 
the use of literacy tests anywhere within the United States has the 
inevitable effect of denying the vote” to persons of color unable to 
pass these tests as a direct result of discriminatory educational sys-
tems.108 Notably, Justice Brennan added that the legislative record 
“amply supported” this conclusion.109
 Once again, a hard question was made easy by a Court that was 
only too willing to step out of the way. And so, after Oregon, only one 
question remained: did the power of Congress under the Fifteenth 
Amendment know any limits? 
3.   The End of the Road? City of Rome
 Ten years later, in City of Rome v. United States,110 Congress ap-
peared to meet its match. This was the sternest challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the Act since the Katzenbach cases. But the Court 
followed its now familiar script and upheld the constitutionality of 
the Act.111 Two questions in particular deserved close attention.  
 First, if the onerous nature of the special provisions of the Act 
were partly justified as a temporary remedy to the problem, how to 
defend yet another extension of the Act, this time from 1975 to 1982? 
To the Court, this was not a difficult question. The Act had accom-
plished much in terms of both black registration and the election of 
black officials, yet Congress had concluded that such progress was 
“modest and spotty.”112 As in previous years, Congress considered the 
existing need for the preclearance requirement in light of such 
progress.113 The record reflected the requisite findings. And so the 
Court concluded: “When viewed [in historical context,] Congress’ con-
sidered determination that at least another 7 years of statutory re-
medies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of 
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pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassaila-
ble.”114
 The second question posed a more difficult challenge. At the time 
of South Carolina, the Court had yet to settle on the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; or, more specifically, it had yet to determine 
whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibited both purposeful ra-
cial discrimination as well as state action that was discriminatory in 
effect. For this reason, the Court need not spend an inordinate 
amount of time in South Carolina discussing the intent/effect lan-
guage of the Act (i.e., the Act’s prohibition on qualifications, stan-
dards, practices, or procedures that have the purpose and will have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color) and whether such a standard remained within the scope of 
the Amendments. In Washington v. Davis,115 however, the Court de-
termined that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause demanded 
purposeful discrimination. By extension, in City of Mobile v. Bol-
den116—decided the same day as City of Rome—the Court incorpo-
rated a similar standard into the Fifteenth Amendment. These two 
cases demanded a reconsideration of the Court’s prior acquiescence 
to the statutory standard. Could Congress prohibit, under the prec-
learance requirement, state voting practices devoid of purposeful dis-
crimination but only with a discriminatory effect? 
 Continuing with its prior deferential posture, a six-member major-
ity answered this question affirmatively.117 The holding rested on fa-
miliar cases—South Carolina, Morgan, and Oregon—which the 
Court read in helpful and forgiving ways. Curiously, the Court did 
not discuss the impact of Washington v. Davis to this area of the law. 
Instead, it explained that “Congress could rationally have concluded 
that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable 
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of 
purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that 
have a discriminatory impact.”118 In other words, the incidence of 
coverage under section 4(b) of the Act—the very section at the heart 
of the constitutional challenge in 1965—was offered as the reason for 
subjecting these covered jurisdictions to a more expansive standard 
than demanded by the Fifteenth Amendment. As hard as it tried, the 
Court explained in a telling passage that it could “find no reason . . . 
to disturb Congress’ considered judgment.”119
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 I neither criticize nor praise the Court’s posture in City of Rome.
Of greater interest is the fact that the Court granted Congress what 
amounted to a free pass under the Reconstruction Amendments to 
solve the nation’s racial ills as Congress saw fit. Or, as Justice Rehn-
quist remarked in his forceful dissent, offering both Marbury v. Mad-
ison120 and United States v. Nixon121 for support and echoing Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Morgan: “While the presumption of constitutio-
nality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of the Federal Gov-
ernment or of one of the States, it is this Court which is ultimately 
responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those 
entities.”122 He concluded that the Court’s decision in that case, City 
of Rome, was “nothing less than a total abdication of that authori-
ty.”123
4.   The Act Meets the New Federalism: Monterey County
 This forgiving posture toward the constitutional status of the Act 
has not been affected by the recent federalism revolution. This is a 
key piece of evidence, for I can scarcely think of any other congres-
sional enactment as intrusive as the Voting Rights Act into matters 
of state concern.124 To be sure, the Court and Congress have acknowl-
edged the federalism concerns raised by the Act. But the argument 
has yet to carry the day. In South Carolina, for example, the Court 
explained that matters within the power of the states are not insu-
lated from federal judicial review when used to “circumvent[] a fed-
erally protected right,”125 a conclusion it reiterated fifteen years later 
in City of Rome.126
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 Crucially, this argument has survived the recent case of City of 
Boerne v. Flores127 and its substantial progeny.128 According to lead-
ing voices within the law of democracy,129 these cases place the Act in 
grave constitutional danger, as neither a congruent nor proportional 
remedy to the asserted constitutional harm. Commentators focus on 
the issue of findings and counsel Congress to develop a detailed and 
thorough record in support of the statute. But this is largely a dis-
traction.130 We have seen this issue before, in South Carolina, Ore-
gon, and City of Rome. We also saw it in Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Morgan. And in case any doubt remained, the Court has been explicit 
about its posture toward the Act in Lopez v. Monterey County,131 a 
case decided post-Boerne.
 In Monterey County, the Court faced yet another difficult question 
raised by the Act: is a state law enacted by a noncovered state sub-
ject to preclearance when a covered county “seek[s] to administer” 
such law? In other words, must Monterey County seek preclearance 
of a law passed by the State of California, a noncovered jurisdiction, 
even though the county exercised no independent discretion in enact-
ing the law? For an answer, the Court referred to the language of the 
statute, which read as follows: “[Federal preclearance is required] 
[w]henever a [covered] State or political subdivision . . . shall enact or 
seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, 
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different 
from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964.”132 The question in 
Monterey County focused on the meaning of the phrase “seek to ad-
minister.” The Court concluded that this language signaled Con-
gress’s clear intention that all changes be precleared irrespective of 
any discretion exercised by the covered jurisdiction in enacting the 
law. As applied to the County of Monterey, this meant that the coun-
ty must submit for preclearance a law from the State of California 
that the county played no role in enacting. 
 The implications of this position were not lost on the Court. To re-
quire Monterey County to preclear changes enacted by the State of 
California would turn California into a pseudo-covered state for pur-
poses of section 5. Yet California did not have the history of discrimi-
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nation that would warrant statutory coverage under the Act. As a 
consequence, this reading of the statutory language might “tread on 
rights constitutionally reserved to the States.”133 This is a considera-
ble argument. Surely Congress could not subject innocent states to 
the drastic measures of section 5 due to the sins of local subdivisions 
within its jurisdiction. Could such an exertion of congressional power 
possibly survive the recent Boerne revolution? 
 In a word, yes. The Court’s response reads like a “who’s who” of 
voting rights law. Many big cases made an appearance, such as 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,134 City of Rome v. United States,135
Gaston County v. United States,136 City of Boerne v. Flores,137 Miller v. 
Johnson,138 and United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. 
v. Carey.139 This cast of characters told you everything you needed to 
know. There were two related issues. The first issue was also an ob-
vious one, and this is exactly where the Court began: yes, the Act im-
poses “substantial ‘federalism costs,’ ”140 yet the Reconstruction 
Amendments by their very nature intrude on matters  
“traditionally reserved to the States.”141 In this sense Monterey Coun-
ty did not present a new question; this was a remake of South Caro-
lina and City of Rome, precedents that the Court was not inclined to 
reconsider.142
 The second issue struck at the heart of Boerne and its progeny: 
could section 5 reach the actions of noncovered states? That is, could 
Congress interfere with matters traditionally left to the states even 
when the requisite evidence of racial discrimination does not exist? 
The Court did not give this question its due, and that fact alone be-
trays the Court’s posture toward the constitutionality of the Act. This 
was an old story, and the Court was sticking to its old script.  
 The Court began, as it must, with South Carolina and its holding 
that Congress may seek to protect against both discriminatory ani-
mus and neutral state action that leads to harmful effects.143 Con-
gress could even choose to protect discriminatory practices with only 
a discriminatory effect; this was City of Rome. This was precisely 
how the Court understood the challenge in Monterey County, so there 
was nothing new to say. Congress could designate jurisdictions for 
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coverage under the Act, and Congress could also reach state actions 
that are only discriminatory in nature. As a consequence, the Court 
concluded that Congress could require preclearance of state laws be-
fore they took effect on a covered county. The Court’s word choice 
was quite revealing: “[s]ection 5, as we interpret it today, burdens 
state law only to the extent that that law affects voting in jurisdic-
tions properly designated for coverage.”144 And, in case any doubt re-
mained, the Court offered what it took to be its trump card: until the 
1970 Amendments extended the ban on literacy tests nationwide, the 
Act suspended literacy tests within covered counties even though 
these tests had been enacted by noncovered states. This was Gaston 
County.145 Again, there was nothing new. 
 Monterey County was a difficult case, or at least it should have 
been. The ease with which the Court situated these challenging facts 
within the Act’s revered holdings betrays the Court’s posture toward 
the statute in general. In this vein, the Court’s conclusion was noth-
ing short of fanciful: “In short, the Voting Rights Act, by its nature, 
intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits 
this intrusion, however, and our holding today adds nothing of con-
stitutional moment to the burdens that the Act imposes.”146 Whether 
one agreed or disagreed with the Court’s conclusion, one must agree 
that the Court did not give the constitutional question at the heart of 
this case its due.147 It is hard not to read Monterey County as an in-
stance of a court trying too hard to reach a desired conclusion.  
 Notably, Monterey County is not an outlying case in a world where 
the Court keeps Congress in close check as it exercises its powers 
under the Reconstruction Amendments. The opposite is true. From 
the time the Court first upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the 
Katzenbach cases, its posture has been deferential and forgiving. The 
contemporary debate over the constitutionality of the recently 
amended Act does not account for this history, and it instead pre-
sumes an aggressive Court. But make no mistake, once this  
debate returns to the Court, the real question will not be one of  
legislative findings and whether the Act is remedial in nature. The 
only question will be whether the Court chooses to follow its tradi-
tional script. 
IV.   STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS DYNAMIC POLICY-MAKING
 Once the Court issued its definitive rulings on the constitutionali-
ty of the Act in the Katzenbach cases, the debate shifted in notable 
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ways. To be sure, some critics refused to accept the Court’s argu-
ments. Prominent among these critics was Senator Sam Ervin, who 
by 1969 had assumed the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee. During the 1969 hear-
ings over amendments and extensions to the Act, for example, he 
remarked: “the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional in every respect 
notwithstanding what the Supreme Court said.”148 But this was a lost 
battle and a waste of energy, as the debate shifted to the substantive 
provisions of the Act. And on this score, the Court clearly led the way. 
 This Part examines the Court’s handling of the language of the 
Act. And the lesson is unmistakable: from the time of the Court’s ini-
tial intervention in this area, the language of the statute and the in-
tent of Congress have been no match for the Justices’ boundless im-
aginations. Section IV.A discusses the early cases, when the Court 
expanded the reach of the statute in ways that surprised even Con-
gress. Section IV.B offers Beer v. United States,149 a case that sig-
naled an end to the Court’s expansive readings of the statutory lan-
guage. Section IV.C moves ahead a generation, to the Bossier Parish
cases.150 As in Beer, these cases exemplify the Justices’ idiosyncratic 
and debatable readings of the Act under the guise of effectuating the 
intent of Congress. Section IV.D closes with Georgia v. Ashcroft,151 an 
opinion that figured prominently in the 2006 debates in Congress. 
The Georgia and Bossier Parish cases are important as one of the few 
moments in the history of the Act when Congress corrected a judicial 
interpretation of the statute. For my purposes, these cases are nota-
ble not for what they say as much as for what they led to: in light of 
the Court’s penchant for interpretive creativity throughout the life of 
the Act, what explains the congressional reactions to these cases? 
A.   The Early Cases 
 The Court’s early handling of the Act’s language follows a predict-
able pattern. From the moment the Court first engaged these mate-
rials in Allen v. State Board of Elections,152 its readings have been 
creative and generous constructions of the language of the statute 
and the intent of Congress. The Court led the way and molded the 
broad and forgiving statutory language to its liking, and Congress 
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willingly acquiesced. This conclusion holds true even at times when 
the language of the statute appeared to offer a contrary outcome. 
 In order to make sense of the Court’s early interpretations of the 
statute, one must first make sense of the goals that Congress and the 
administration were pursuing with the Act. For evidence of these 
goals, I turn to the House subcommittee hearings. 
 The hearings began on March 18, 1965, a scant three days after 
President Johnson delivered his voting rights address to a joint ses-
sion of Congress. From the time Chairman Celler called the meeting 
to order, the goal of the new legislation became clear. As the chair-
man explained during his opening statement: “The time is here for 
action. This committee will consider a strong bill that will guarantee 
to Negroes the inalienable right to vote, and to safeguard that vote as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”153 The bill was a direct response to 
the assortment of vote denial practices then in effect—“[t]he legal-
isms, stratagems, trickery, and coercion”154—that kept a majority of 
voters of color from exercising their right to vote. Or, in the words of 
Congressman McCulloch: “[T]he untrammeled right of qualified citi-
zens to vote is the very cornerstone of representative government. 
That right has been denied to many people in this country under col-
or of law, and otherwise, too long. The time has come when such 
denial must cease . . . .”155
 The goal of the Act, in other words, was to remove discriminatory 
tests and devices that denied otherwise qualified blacks of their right 
to vote. Time and again, Attorney General Katzenbach made precise-
ly this point in the context of defending the aggressive nature of the 
new bill. Early on during his testimony, for example, he stated that 
the bill sought to “translate [the government’s good] intentions into 
ballots.”156 Moments later, he explained the bill as follows: 
It is designed to deal with the two principal means of frustrating 
the 15th amendment: the use of onerous, vague, unfair tests and 
devices enacted for the purpose of disenfranchising Negroes, and 
the discriminatory administration of these and other kinds of reg-
istration requirements. The bill accomplishes its objectives first, by 
outlawing the use of these tests under certain circumstances, and 
second, by providing for registration by Federal officials where ne-
cessary to ensure the fair administration of the registration system.157
 The Attorney General repeated this point throughout his  
testimony. “Our concern today,” he told the subcommittee, “is to en-
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large representative government, to solicit the consent of all the go-
verned, to increase the number of citizens who can vote.”158 Moments 
later, he explained that “the whole bill really is aimed at getting 
people registered.”159
 This position was met with some criticism from members of Con-
gress who wished for the legislation to go further. For example, Con-
gressman Corman asked whether the bill could attempt to deal with 
other important questions, such as the issue of qualifications for 
running for public office.160 After all, what would be the point of al-
lowing blacks to register and vote if they could not run for office or, 
at the very least, vote for their candidates of choice? In an oft-cited 
passage, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall responded: 
“The problem that the bill was aimed at was the problem of registra-
tion, Congressman. If there is a problem of another sort, I would like 
to see it corrected, but that is not what we were trying to deal with in 
the bill.”161
 There should be little question about the primary goals of the pro-
posed bill. The political process across the South was a broken 
process, and the bill aimed to fix it. In the face of mass disenfran-
chisement, the bill sought to (1) allow voters to register and (2) make 
sure they were allowed to vote. Hence the suspension of literacy 
tests, the need for poll watchers and federal registrars, and the prec-
learance requirement. The text of section 5 is particularly instructive 
in uncovering the goals of the statute. Recall that under this section, 
a covered jurisdiction may not seek to implement a voting change un-
til preclearing it with the Department of Justice or the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. Yet before gaining prec-
learance for a voting change, “ ‘no person shall be denied the right to 
vote for failure to comply with’ ”162 any such change. This must mean 
that section 5 was intended to reach only those changes with which 
prospective voters could comply.163 Until such changes were prec-
leared, a prospective voter must be allowed to vote. 
 And then came, three years later, Allen v. State Board of Elec-
tions.164 Allen stood at a crucial moment in the Act’s history and 
would decide its impact into the future. The case is important not on-
ly for the needed changes it brought to the preclearance process, but 
also because it signaled the Court’s willingness to dialogue with Con-
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gress in keeping the Act abreast of modern circumstances. Take first 
the three procedural questions presented in the case: May a private 
litigant bring a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a 
voting change falls under section 5 of the Act? If so, must these pri-
vate litigants bring their suits in the District of Columbia District 
Court? And, did Congress intend for these suits to be heard before 
three-judge courts? These questions ranged in difficulty, and the sta-
tute provided varying degrees of support.  
 The Court’s answers to these questions are not nearly as impor-
tant as the evidentiary support offered by the Court. On the first 
question, for example, the Court conceded that the statute was silent 
on this issue, yet it ultimately concluded that private litigants may 
bring these declaratory judgment suits.165 To decide otherwise would 
mean that “[t]he achievement of the Act’s laudable goal could be se-
verely hampered”166 and the promise of section 5 “might well prove 
an empty promise.”167 In short, the promise of the Act could not be 
left at the hands of the limited staff and resources of the Office of the 
Attorney General.168 The government needed help in enforcing the 
new law. 
 On the second question, the Court faced a more daunting chal-
lenge. According to section 14(b) of the Act, “[n]o court other than the 
District Court for the District of Columbia . . . shall have jurisdiction 
to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to [§ 5] or any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction against the execu-
tion or enforcement of any provision of this Act . . . .”169 This language 
strongly suggested that these private suits must be brought in “the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.” But the Court had dif-
ferent ideas in mind. According to Allen, the language of section 14(b) 
applied only to suits brought by the state under section 5, because 
these were suits where the state sought an adjudication that the vot-
ing change did not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying the right to vote on account of race or color.170 When a pri-
vate litigant brings suit, however, a court must only determine 
whether the enactment in question falls under the purview of section 
5. This distinction—or what the Court referred to as “the magnitude 
of these two issues”171—meant that litigants may bring their private 
suits in their local district courts. 
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 The Court answered the third question similarly. Instead of a 
close reading of the statutory language or a careful analysis of legis-
lative materials, the Court offered the following: “in light of the ex-
traordinary nature of the Act in general, and the unique approval re-
quirement of § 5, Congress intended that disputes involving the cov-
erage of § 5 be determined by a district court of three judges.”172
 The substantive question at the heart of the Allen case occupied 
much of the Court’s time, and for good measure. This was the main 
attraction—the question that would determine the Act’s impact to 
the future. As codified under section 5 of the Act, what was a “voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or proce-
dure with respect to voting”?173 One answer, pressed forcefully by 
Justice Harlan in dissent, argued that this language referred only to 
laws by which voters registered to vote and had their ballots 
counted.174 If looking to the intent of the 89th Congress and the 
Johnson administration, and as I argued previously, I think this is 
the right answer. But the Court rejected this argument. Instead, the 
Court explained, “[t]he Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as 
well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of deny-
ing citizens their right to vote because of their race.”175 This clear in-
tention, coupled with the “weight of the legislative history,”176 led the 
Court to conclude that Congress intended that “all changes, no mat-
ter how small, be subjected to § 5 scrutiny.”177 Examples include the 
following: changes from districted to at-large elections;178 changes 
from election to appointment of county officials;179 new procedures for 
casting write-in ballots;180 and changes to the requirements for inde-
pendent candidates who choose to run in general elections.181 The 
reach of Allen was subsequently extended to reapportionment plans;182
annexations;183 and, inter alia, changing locations of polling places.184
 This conclusion ran up against some difficult textual challenges. 
In particular, how to square the Court’s expansive interpretation of 
the scope of section 5 in the face of the statutory language directing 
the preclearance requirement towards changes with which persons 
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could “comply”?185 The Solicitor General admitted that this provision 
was inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of the Act, yet of-
fered that it resulted from congressional oversight.186 The Court 
simply ignored it.187
 The Court’s creative handling of the language of the statute con-
tinued through the years. In Gaston County v. United States,188 the 
Court offered a similarly expansive interpretation of section 4(a) of 
the Act. Under this section, a covered jurisdiction wishing to reins-
tate its suspended test or device must show that “no such test or de-
vice has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the 
action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.”189 Gaston County wished to 
make such a showing in federal court. But the district court denied it 
relief, concluding that the county’s history of segregated and unequal 
education would mean that the literacy test would have the effect of 
discriminating against blacks. While underscoring its view that this 
was not a per se rule, and in an opinion authored by Justice Harlan, 
the Supreme Court agreed. Under section 4(a) of the Act, in other 
words, a reviewing court may consider whether a literacy test would 
have the effect of denying the right to vote as a consequence of the 
jurisdiction’s history of segregated and inferior schools.190
 In saying this, my point is not to suggest that the Court was 
wrong to decide Allen and Gaston County as it did. Rather, my point 
is only to underscore the obvious: the Allen decision, while necessary 
from a real-world view, was neither preordained nor demanded by 
the statutory materials. In fact, it may be said that Congress, in fail-
ing once again to anticipate the Southern response to the Act, did not 
make the Court’s response any easier. But the Court was up to the task. 
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B.   The Standards of Preclearance and the Search for  
Congressional Intent: On the Birth of Retrogression 
 All too soon, however, the honeymoon came to an end. With City of 
Richmond v. United States191 and Beer v. United States,192 the Court 
began an apparent retreat from its earlier, expansive interpretations 
of the Act. The Beer opinion is particularly instructive for how the 
Court made use of the available congressional materials and reached 
a conclusion that is, to put it charitably, debatable at best. This Sec-
tion focuses its attention on Beer as yet another example of an ag-
gressive Court doing what it wants with the open-ended and forgiv-
ing language of the Voting Rights Act. 
 The question at the heart of the Beer litigation appeared to be a 
relatively simple one: in applying section 5 of the Act, under what 
standard must the district court or the Attorney General assess 
whether a districting plan has the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on racial grounds?193 Upon inspection, however, this 
question proved to be anything but simple, perhaps unnecessarily so. 
After all, as the district court recognized in an opinion authored by 
Judge Spottswood Robinson, III, “[t]he legislative history of the Act 
establishes the full and firm allegiance of its own objectives with the 
goals of the [Fifteenth] Amendment.”194 In using “parallel lan-
guage,”195 Congress signaled its intention to enforce the dictates of 
the Fifteenth Amendment without resorting to the traditionally time-
consuming judicial process.  
 In other words, it stands to reason that Congress simply wished to 
shift the constitutional inquiry both temporally and institutionally to 
the Attorney General or the district court, before changes in the law 
took place, while also shifting the burden of proof and placing it on 
the states and political subdivisions. The standard under section 5 
review would thus be the same standard under the Fifteenth 
Amendment,196 with section 5 acting as a prophylactic. The fact that 
Congress said little about the particular standard that would govern 
section 5 inquiries is telling, particularly since section 5 had become 
by 1975 the “centerpiece” of the Act.197 If the standard were anything 
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other than what common sense would appear to dictate, surely Con-
gress would have made its intentions far more explicit. 
 The district court in Beer understood its task under section 5 
along these lines. To its credit, the district court conducted a nuanced 
and fact-intensive inquiry, which highlighted the clear and long-
standing role played by race in the political and cultural life of New 
Orleans.198 The court then looked to the doctrinal structure provided 
by the Supreme Court’s reapportionment cases and analogized its 
“abridgment” inquiry under the Act to the Supreme Court’s vote dilu-
tion inquiry.199 In making this move, the court made clear that “the 
question before us is not whether New Orleans must confer upon its 
black citizens every political advantage that a redistricting plan con-
ceivably could offer.”200 Rather, plaintiffs must “press vigorously . . . 
for all that is their due, but . . . no more.”201 Or, as former Attorney 
General Katzenbach argued during the 1975 Senate hearings, 
“[w]hile blacks have made important gains, these gains do not reflect 
the political power of their numbers were there no discrimination.”202
 The inquiry was essentially an inquiry of unconstitutional vote di-
lution as commonly understood. Such an inquiry demands a compari-
son between an optimal state of affairs and the challenged circums-
tances. In this vein, the court explained that “the relevant compari-
son is between the results which the minority is constitutionally free 
to command and the results which the plan leaves the minority able 
to achieve.”203 Put another way, the comparison was between theoret-
ical results free of any dilutive influence and the actual results under 
the challenged districting plan. On the facts, the district court con-
cluded that the districting plan would unjustifiably dilute the black 
vote in New Orleans and that “[s]urely the Fifteenth Amendment . . . 
discountenances the abridgment evident in this case.”204 Under the 
factors of Zimmer v. McKeithen205 and recent vote dilution case law,206
the court further concluded that the plan would unjustifiably dilute 
the potential black voting strength in the city.207 Finally, the court 
                                                                                                                    
 198. See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 374-75. 
 199. See id. at 383. 
 200. Id. at 389. 
 201. Id. at 390. 
 202. Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S. 
1409, and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 125 (1975). 
 203. Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 388. 
 204. Id. at 393. 
 205. 485 F. 2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 206. See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 384-85. 
 207. See id. at 393-99. 
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concluded also that the city had not justified its use of two at-large 
seats.208
 In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed.209 Over a scant twelve-page opinion, the Court ma-
naged to turn what could be a difficult issue—if the lower court opi-
nion is any indication—into a simplistic one. The question was the 
same: when does a districting plan have “the effect of denying or ab-
ridging the right to vote on account of race or color”?210 The Court be-
gan its analysis by pointing out that this inquiry is not a constitu-
tional inquiry; rather, it is a question of statutory interpretation.211
This meant, of course, that the Act’s legislative history and Con-
gress’s intent were controlling. Then, after offering a smattering of 
quotes and citations from past opinions and congressional reports, 
the Court shifted its gaze to the 1975 House Report. In particular, 
the Court focused on the following passage: 
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act in 
1975, Congress explicitly stated that “the standard [under § 5] can 
only be fully satisfied by determining on the basis of the facts 
found by the Attorney General [or the District Court] to be true 
whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the politi-
cal process and to elect their choices to office is augmented, dimi-
nished, or not affected by the change affecting voting . . . .”212
 From this passage, the Court created the following standard: “the 
purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure 
changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the po-
sition of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of 
the electoral franchise.”213 On this view, a section 5 inquiry would fo-
cus on the retrogressive effect of the plan under review and whether 
people of color were worse off than under the baseline as established 
by the previous plan. Yet, almost in passing, the Court offered what 
seemed an important addendum: even if a plan is ameliorative in na-
ture, it “cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so 
discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitu-
tion.”214 That is, unless the plan violates the Fifteenth Amendment.215
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 Under this standard, the Court looked to the previous plan, 
enacted in 1961, and compared it to the plan under review. Under 
the 1961 plan, people of color did not have any majorities in any of 
the districts; yet, under the reviewed 1971 plan, they would have one 
and maybe two such districts. From these facts, the Court concluded 
that the reviewed plan did not violate the effects prong of the prec-
learance requirement. 
 This is a questionable conclusion; at best, and as Justice Marshall 
underscored in dissent, it is a contested reading of the legislative his-
tory and the statutory language.216 One searches in vain for support 
through the congressional hearings. The House hearings in 1975 
never mentioned the concept of retrogression as the standard under 
which to measure the effects inquiry under section 5, and neither did 
the 1971 House hearings by the Civil Rights Oversight Subcommit-
tee, from which the 1975 House Report drew its retrogression language. 
 To be sure, the Court wrote that Congress “explicitly stated” its 
understanding of the preclearance standard as one of retrogression. 
But that is simply untrue. Here is what Congress explicitly did: in 
the spring of 1971, it held hearings on “The Enforcement and Admin-
istration of the Voting Rights Act,” during which myriad references 
to section 5 were offered. Tellingly, none of these references made use 
of the retrogression language. In January 1972, this same committee 
issued a report, “Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in 
Mississippi,” where it recommended that the Department of Justice 
step up its preclearance responsibilities, “particularly where the 
change would have a substantial impact on the voting rights of many 
people.”217
 As for the preclearance standard, the Report explained that it “is 
not fully satisfied by an indication that the administration of the 
change affecting voting will be impartial or neutral.”218 Only then did 
the Report go on to state the language later borrowed by the 1975 
Report and ultimately by the Court majority in Beer: the standard is 
whether the ability of people of color to participate in the political 
process and elect the representatives of their choice is “augmented, 
diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting.”219 On its 
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face, it is not altogether clear how the Beer majority arrives at the re-
trogression standard from this paragraph taken as a whole. And it 
gets better, for the majority left out the best part. Right after the el-
lipses, the Court didn’t think necessary to keep the following pas-
sage: “in view of the political, sociological, economic, and psychologi-
cal circumstances within the community proposing the change.”220 So 
here is the relevant passage, in full: 
[The] standard [under § 5] can only be fully satisfied by determin-
ing on the basis of the facts found by the Attorney General [or the 
District Court] to be true whether the ability of minority groups to 
participate in the political process and to elect their choices to  
office is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change  
affecting voting in view of the political, sociological, economic, and 
psychological circumstances within the community proposing  
the change.221
 With the added language, the passage might be said to offer sup-
port for the lower court’s opinion in Beer, not the Court majority. But 
the Court seemed intent in narrowing the scope of the preclearance 
inquiry, and contrary legislative history—or even the fact that the li-
tigants themselves did not think to argue for the standard as the 
Court ultimately understood it in their briefs—would not stand in  
its way.  
 Beer is also remarkable for the way in which the district court’s 
analysis of the substantial meaning of section 5 differed from that of 
the Supreme Court. Judge Robinson’s opinion is expansive, nuanced, 
and arguably more faithful to Congress’s expansive views of the pur-
pose behind the Act than Justice Stewart’s narrow opinion for the 
Court. During the 1975 debates over extension of the Act, for exam-
ple, the 94th Congress explicitly recognized that questions of repre-
sentation and political fairness are difficult questions, and the ques-
tion of discrimination in the political process was then a question of 
vote dilution.222 In this vein, it is clear that Congress in 1975 would 
side with Judge Robinson’s opinion over Justice Stewart’s. But that 
is one beauty of having five votes on the Court—one need not worry 
about being right. And, as for reading the statute narrowly, this 
would not be the last time. 
C.   Retrogression to the End: The Bossier Parish Cases 
 Move the story ahead a generation, to the attempt by the Bossier 
Parish School Board to redraw its new district lines. The Board’s 
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plan, modeled after a previously approved plan, was denied preclear-
ance by the Department of Justice because a plan presented to the 
Board by the NAACP had been able to create two majority black dis-
tricts, whereas the submitted plan had none. More specifically, the 
Attorney General had objected to the Board’s plan because, as re-
quired by its own regulations, she must withhold preclearance when 
“ ‘necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2.’ ”223 On 
appeal, the lower court precleared the plan,224 and the Supreme 
Court ultimately faced two separate questions: whether a violation of 
section 2 demands a denial of preclearance under section 5; and 
whether the Attorney General must preclear a plan enacted with dis-
criminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. The following Sections ex-
amine the Court’s answers to these questions. As before, these cases 
are instructive for how the Court reaches its conclusions. This is ag-
gressive and creative statutory interpretation with a vengeance. 
1.   Uncoupling Section 2 from Section 5 
 In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish I), the 
Court answered the first question—whether a section 2 violation de-
mands a denial of preclearance under section 5—in the negative.225
To the Court, making a violation of section 2 a basis for denying prec-
learance under section 5 would mean that the Department of Justice 
“would routinely attempt to avail themselves of this new reason for 
denying preclearance.”226 This would mean that “for all intent and 
purposes”227 the standard of section 2 would replace the standard of 
section 5, and the retrogression inquiry would be replaced by a vote 
dilution inquiry. The Court soundly rejected this position, for it con-
tradicted existing doctrine and further increased the “serious federal-
ism costs already implicated by § 5.”228
 This is a debatable conclusion, for it elevates the retrogression in-
quiry above the structure of the Act and the intent of Congress. On 
the first point, it is clear that section 2 was intended as a restate-
ment of the Fifteenth Amendment229 and the bill as a whole was 
aimed at enforcing the same Amendment. In turn, section 5 was in-
tended to prevent states from violating the Fifteenth Amendment in 
ways that Congress could not foresee in 1965. Or as Armand Derfner 
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explained during the 1971 Hearings, “Section 5 was a look down the 
road to prevent, in advance, stratagems whose nature was unknown 
but which Congress knew would be forthcoming when literacy tests 
were abolished.”230 As enacted in 1965, then, it must be the case that 
section 5 would incorporate section 2, for the crux of the preclearance 
requirement was preventing future violations of the Fifteenth 
Amendment as codified under section 2. Put another way, section 5 
was not concerned with the applicable standards under section 2 as 
much as with the enactment of electoral provisions that would vi-
olate the Fifteenth Amendment. And, so long as section 2 was a res-
tatement of the Fifteenth Amendment, section 5 would by definition 
incorporate section 2. This argument has not only the legislative 
record on its side, but logic—and perhaps experience—as well. 
 In fairness, the 1982 Amendments might be understood as alter-
ing this reading of the Act. Yet, in fact, the congressional reaction to 
City of Mobile does not affect the larger argument. It is worth noting, 
first and foremost, that Congress was responding to yet another nar-
row reading of the statutory language; in City of Mobile v. Bolden,231
the Court understood section 2 as Congress had understood it: as a 
restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment. This meant, as the Court 
underscored, that the standard under section 2 would be one of  
discriminatory intent, rather than the more flexible and forgiving 
standard of discriminatory effect. Congress soon altered this reading 
of section 2 in 1982, uncoupling the statutory requirement from  
its constitutional anchor and requiring a finding of discriminatory ef-
fect instead. 
 To the Court, the 1982 Amendment made all the difference in the 
world. On their original rendition, the target of sections 2 and 5 was 
the same: racial discrimination in voting, both in the present and in-
to the future. In amending the Act, however, section 2 ceased to 
simply restate the constitutional standard as the Court understood 
it. This had grave repercussions for the section 5 inquiry and the ar-
gument that section 5 incorporated a section 2 inquiry, according to 
the Court in Bossier Parish I. Namely, it would shift the preclearance 
inquiry from nonretrogression to vote dilution and call into question 
the Beer nonretrogression standard. It would also raise the already 
serious “federalism costs” exacted by section 5 and in so doing might 
push the Act to the brink of unconstitutionality. Tellingly, the Court 
also remained unimpressed by the Attorney General’s regulations, 
which interpreted section 5 as requiring a denial of preclearance if in 
violation of section 2, and by considerations of public policy, which 
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counseled against a grant of preclearance for electoral changes that 
would ultimately violate section 2.232
 These arguments must be read in the context of the times and the 
Court’s dissatisfaction with the Department of Justice’s handling of 
its preclearance responsibilities.233 To the Court, the Department of 
Justice had pushed its reading of the Act—a reading that the Court 
understood as one of maximizing majority-minority districts—too far 
and ultimately rendered the resulting state actions unconstitutional. 
Hence, section 2 had ceased to be a measure of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Instead, it had become a tool of public policy and the 
yardstick for what a proper structure of representation would look 
like.234 On this view, it is easy and perhaps unavoidable to conclude 
that section 5 does not incorporate section 2. 
 It must be noted, however, how this posture comes in direct ten-
sion with the classic voting rights decisions of the 1960s and the 
Court’s forgiving interpretations of congressional power. Under Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan,235 for example, the Court allowed Congress room 
to interpret rights under the Fourteenth Amendment beyond what 
the Court itself would recognize. Such an argument under the Mor-
gan power would mean that Congress could interpret the Fifteenth 
Amendment under section 2 of the Act more expansively than the 
Court allowed in City of Mobile. On this view, section 5 would still 
incorporate section 2 under Congress’s reading of a constitutional vi-
olation under the Amendment. But the Court was not interested in 
this argument. Once Congress offered a different reading of the 
Amendment through section 2 of the Act, section 5 could no longer be 
used to enforce section 2 into the future.236
 Regardless of one’s stance about the Court’s views on congression-
al power, it is also intriguing how the Court spends so little time—if 
any—sorting through the legislative materials and how selective the 
Court chooses to be when doing so. In this vein, recall how in Beer
the Court was much too willing to ground the doctrine on its debata-
ble reading of the House report. Yet, in Bossier Parish, the Court 
proved unwilling to accept language from the House and Senate Re-
ports that, according to Justice Stevens and anyone willing to engage 
the Reports at all, unequivocally expressed a congressional intent to 
incorporate section 2 within the preclearance dictates of section 5. 
                                                                                                                    
 232. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 483-85. 
 233. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 917-18; Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 
(S.D. Ga. 1994) (contending that by the third round of submissions from Georgia to the De-
partment of Justice, “[i]t was now clear to the General Assembly that preclearance would 
not be forthcoming without adopting this raison d’être of the max-black proposals” and that 
“[t]his goal dominated the creation of the third Georgia submission” (citation omitted)). 
 234. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 235. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 236. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 481-82. 
2009] PARADOXICAL CASE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 737 
According to the Senate Report, for example, “[i]n light of the 
amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also 
follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate 
section 2.”237 In a subsequent report four years later, a House sub-
committee similarly concluded that “it is a proper interpretation of 
the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to use section 2 stan-
dards in the course of making section 5 determinations.”238 But the 
Court was not interested in such technical matters. Its questionable 
adoption of the retrogression standard in Beer ruled the day.  
2.   Turning the Act on its Head: Preclearing Discrimination 
 And two years later, in Bossier Parish II,239 the retrogression 
standard ruled the day again. The question this time was whether 
the Department of Justice must preclear a redistricting plan enacted 
with discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. Unsurprisingly, 
the Court also answered this question in narrow fashion, construing 
the language of the statute as requiring a denial of preclearance un-
der the purpose prong of section 5 only for retrogressive dilution.240
After Bossier Parish II, the retrogression standard would apply not 
only to the discriminatory effects inquiry, but to the question of dis-
criminatory purpose as well. 
 The best that can be said for this reading of the statute is that it 
was “outlandish.”241 The Court began by looking to the relevant lan-
guage, under which a covered jurisdiction must show that its pro-
posed change “ ‘does not have the purpose and will not have the effect 
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or col-
or.’ ”242 From this language, the argument was disarmingly simple: if 
the effect prong of the statute required a retrogression inquiry, the 
Court concluded that it must interpret the purpose prong similarly 
since, “[a]s we have in the past, we refuse to adopt a construction 
that would attribute different meanings to the same phrase in the 
same sentence, depending on which object it is modifying.”243 Thus, 
following Beer, retrogression would become the hallmark of the prec-
learance inquiry. 
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 This is an outlandish conclusion because it does not even pretend 
to comport with the statute’s structure and Congress’s intent. The 
reason for including a preclearance requirement, according to Attor-
ney General Katzenbach, was to subject “the State which had been 
discriminating in the past . . . to some kind of limitations as to any 
new legislation that it might propose.”244 Or, as he explained during 
the Senate hearings, the preclearance requirement “is an attempt to 
prevent new laws which would frustrate the objectives of Congress 
here.”245 During his testimony in front of the House subcommittee, 
Joseph Rauh explained the need for the preclearance requirement  
as follows: 
 You are about, I take it, to pass legislation to remedy previous 
discrimination. All you are saying here is, “We are not going to 
permit-new evasive devices, we are going to freeze the situation as 
it is today unless new tests have been brought to court and found 
to be nondiscriminatory.” 
 I would say this provision is simply self-defense of Congress. The 
States you are now seeking to prevent from discriminating—this is 
a way of preventing those States from finding a new method of dis-
crimination. I think this is a necessary part of the self-defense of 
the bill you are about to enact.246
 If section 5 stood for anything at all in the eyes of the 89th Con-
gress, it would be the view that the Attorney General must not prec-
lear electoral changes that discriminated on the basis of race. Noth-
ing that Congress did during the debates of 1969, 1975, or 1982 re-
futes this central premise of the Act. 
 Yet to the Court, “this is simply an untenable construction of the 
text.”247 Not only is the Court’s reading of the Act necessitated by the 
language of the statute, the Court argues, but a contrary reading of 
the purpose prong as reaching nonretrogressive vote dilution practic-
es “would also exacerbate the ‘substantial’ federalism costs that the 
preclearance procedure already exacts, perhaps to the extent of rais-
ing concerns about § 5’s constitutionality.”248 And this might really be 
the crux of the matter, irrespective of any congressional intent. Had 
Congress really intended to reach nonretrogressive state actions 
through the purpose prong of section 5, the Court suggests that this 
would be unconstitutional.  
 To be as charitable as possible, the Court’s position simply makes 
no sense. Why couldn’t Congress determine that a purpose inquiry 
could precede the implementation of a statute in covered jurisdic-
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tions? The Court does not say. For support, it cites Miller v. John-
son’s admonition that the Department of Justice’s maximization poli-
cy extends beyond the reach of the statute and is in direct tension 
with constitutional norms.249 But this hardly offers any persuasive 
support. And further, the retrogression standard was not a conces-
sion to any “ ‘substantial’ federalism costs,”250 but rather a simple 
matter of statutory interpretation and legislative intent. To suggest 
that the adoption of any standard other than retrogression would 
render the Act unconstitutional is a baffling proposition, and the 
Court does not spend any time defending this claim. 
 In the end, the Court offered a lawyerly brief, full of technical ar-
guments and distinguished cases. If a precedent seemed to stand in 
its way, its conclusion would be “nothing more than an ex necessitate
limitation upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexa-
tion,”251 or the case would “involve[] an unusual fact pattern,”252 or 
contrary language would be “pure dictum.”253 Such is the beauty of a 
Court majority and a willingness to reach a particular outcome; coun-
ter arguments and contrary cases seldom offer enough resistance. 
D.   The Last Straw?: Georgia v. Ashcroft
 If Beer and the Bossier Parish cases show the beauty of counting 
to five, a recent case, Georgia v. Ashcroft,254 shows a different kind of 
beauty: if one waits long enough, legal doctrine is likely to come full 
circle. In Georgia, the Court offered its latest examination of the re-
trogression standard. This time around, the standard took on a loose 
yet nuanced—and some might say worthless255—persona. The doc-
trinal terrain prior to Georgia bears repeating: a voting change that 
discriminates against voters of color must be precleared if nonretro-
gressive.256 In fact, the retrogression inquiry does not involve how 
unconstitutional the challenged plan may be; it only involves wheth-
er the plan “preserves ‘current minority voting strength.’ ”257 The 
Court in Bossier Parish II reached this conclusion on its idiosyncratic 
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reading of the statutory language.258 Had the Court focused on the 
legislative history, the result would have been different. 
 Be that as it may, Georgia is important for the way in which the 
Court can be understood as connecting the inquiry back to the con-
cerns raised by Congress a generation before. Consider first the in-
quiry as the Court understood it: to determine what an “ ‘effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise’ ”259 means. To the Court, this in-
quiry “depend[ed] on an examination of all the relevant circums-
tances, such as the ability of voters to elect their candidate of choice, 
the extent of the minority group’s opportunity to participate in the 
political process, and the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive 
plan.”260 This was a totality of circumstances inquiry, the Court ex-
plained, and a flexible and forgiving inquiry to boot. No one factor 
would be determinative and, in specific reference to districting plans, 
jurisdictions would retain much flexibility in choosing which theory 
of representation to reflect in their plans.261
 One way to read the Georgia case is, as Justice Souter read it, as 
leaving nothing of the preclearance inquiry as Congress must have 
envisioned it.262 Consider in this vein the words of Attorney General 
Katzenbach during the Senate hearings on the need for preclearance:  
 It occurred to us that there are other ways in which States can 
discriminate, and we have had experience with State legislative ef-
forts in other areas, for example, limiting the registrars to very 
short periods of time, or the imposition of either very high poll tax-
es or property taxes which would have the effect of denying or ab-
ridging rights guaranteed under the 15th Amendment, that kind of 
law should be covered, too. 
 This was put in with an effort of not letting a State legislature 
continue past practices of discrimination, preventing that or sub-
jecting that to judicial review, somewhat the same way that State 
reapportionment plans are subjected to judicial review in order to 
determine their constitutionality.263
 If this is in fact what the Johnson administration and the 89th 
Congress had in mind for the preclearance inquiry, then clearly there 
is very little left of it. Under modern doctrine, the courts must prec-
lear even those plans that are found to discriminate against people of 
color; and under Georgia, reviewing courts must read the facts flexi-
bly and forgivingly, making a finding of retrogression even more un-
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likely than originally presumed. Under the law as it now stands, few 
plans will fail to gain preclearance. 
 Yet Georgia has a silver lining as well. Recall that in Allen, the 
Court offered an expansive view of the right to vote and the coverage 
of the Act, recasting the preclearance inquiry as inter alia a dilution 
inquiry. And in Beer, the lower court similarly offered a broader view 
of the political culture of New Orleans, which made a finding of ra-
cial discrimination in voting more likely. Georgia takes us back to 
these cases, if obliquely so, and to the 1975 congressional hearings. 
The issue then was one of political power and full and effective par-
ticipation in the political process. These are the same issues that 
permeate Georgia’s majority opinion.  
 I do not wish to be misunderstood, however; I agree with Justice 
Souter’s dissent that this view of retrogression empties section 5 of 
any remaining substantive content. Looking back to the early con-
gressional debates and the clear goals of the Act, and when thinking 
about the ways in which political actors used both the preclearance 
requirement and the Fourteenth Amendment for political purposes 
as seen in the 1990s in North Carolina,264 Texas,265 and Georgia,266 to 
name a few leading examples, this might not be such a bad thing af-
ter all. The policy choices seem clear: exalting Beer and its retrogres-
sion inquiry as the standard of choice or expanding the preclearance 
inquiry under Section 5 and thus affording political actors more dis-
cretion to accommodate any and all relevant districting factors as 
needed. When all the evidence is in, I have a hard time faulting the 
Court for following the latter approach. 
V. HEEDING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: NAMUDNO AS A CASE STUDY
 The history of the Voting Rights Act is thus a story of deference to 
Congress on questions of constitutional law and aggressive and crea-
tive interpretations of the language of the statute. The statute re-
mains an exercise of congressional powers, but the Court holds the 
final word on what the terms of the statute might mean, often in 
complete disregard of anything Congress might have possibly in-
tended. The recent amendments and extension of the Voting Rights 
Act threatened to break free from this story. The case was NAMUDO 
v. Holder. But in the end, it was only more of the same.  
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A. More of the Same: Deference 
 Days after President Bush signed the proposed bill into law, 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One 
(“NAMUDNO”) challenged the constitutionality of this newest exten-
sion of the Act in federal district court.267 The arguments were famil-
iar ones. For example, NAMUDNO complained that the preclearance 
requirements as applied to the district were “disproportionate to the 
original conditions that caused Texas to be covered by § 5,”268
over-inclusive,269 a punishment that was both incongruous and  
irrational,270 a “badge of shame”271 on covered jurisdictions, “costly 
and burdensome,”272 and “a burdensome imposition on the sovereign 
rights of political subdivisions in covered jurisdictions.”273 While  
saying this, NAMUDNO recognized that the Court had upheld  
the constitutionality of the Act numerous times. But at the time of 
these challenges, “the conditions justifying preclearance were still 
very recent.”274 Continuation of the preclearance requirement a gen-
eration later was thus “both arbitrary and irrational . . . and, worse, 
under the same coverage formula established in a bygone era.”275
“Times have changed,” NAMUDNO concluded, “and § 5 should now 
be struck down as unconstitutional, either on its face, or as applied to 
the district.”276
 The three-judge panel rejected these arguments and unanimously 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The constitutional arguments 
were the main attraction and they occupied the majority of the 
court’s attention. The court first settled on South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach and its rationality test—as opposed to City of Boerne’s congru-
ence and proportionality test—as the proper standard for evaluating 
the work of Congress.277 Consequently, the court spent the bulk of the 
opinion answering the following questions:  
how do the nature and magnitude of the racial discrimination in 
voting revealed in the 2006 legislative record compare to the condi-
tions documented by Congress in 1975, and is the 2006 record suf-
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ficiently comparable to the 1975 record for us to conclude that 
Congress again acted rationally when it extended section 5 for 
another twenty-five years?278
Put another way: has the Act accomplished the ends it sought to ac-
complish or does the need for these “stringent”279 and “inventive”280
measures still exist? 
 The court answered these questions by looking to the same evi-
dentiary sources accepted by the Supreme Court in City of Rome: ra-
cial disparities in registration, number of minority elected officials, 
and preclearance objections.281 In addition, the NAMUDNO court also 
considered the following: “more information request” letters from the 
Attorney General, judicial preclearance suits, section 5 enforcement 
actions, section 2 litigation, appointment of federal election observ-
ers, the existence of racially polarized voting, and evidence of section 
5’s deterrent effect.282 Taken as a whole, this evidence, coupled with 
the deference owed Congress under the Katzenbach standard, led the 
court to conclude the following: 
[W]e see no constitutional basis for rejecting Congress’s considered 
judgment that “[d]espite the substantial progress that has been 
made, the evidence before the Committee resembles the evidence 
before Congress in 1965 and the evidence that was present again 
in 1970, 1975, [and] 1982”—evidence the Supreme Court twice 
found sufficient to justify section 5.283
 The panel’s opinion in NAMUDNO was well-crafted, thorough, 
and fair on both the law and the facts. It also took for granted the 
one question that scholars and commentators must confront head on: 
will the Supreme Court approach the work of Congress in 2006 with 
the same deference and humility that it approached analogous work 
in South Carolina and City of Rome? The NAMUDNO panel certainly 
thought so. It remained to be seen whether the Court would continue 
to treat the work of Congress with the same deference. 
 For a telling example, consider what I took to be the most impor-
tant question for both the panel and for the Supreme Court on ap-
peal. Aside from a vocal critical minority, few disputed the extreme 
nature of the problem as it existed in 1965, the “exceptional condi-
tions” that justified such an “uncommon exercise of Congressional 
power.”284 Moving the story ahead forty-one years, this must mean, 
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according to the plaintiffs in NAMUDNO, that “Congress could not 
permissibly [extend section 5] with no showing that [the] extraordi-
nary conditions [of 1965] persist in modern times.”285 To the plain-
tiffs, such evidence does not exist; but instead, as they point out, the 
complete opposite is true: Congress offered numerous examples that 
“negate the existence of extraordinary circumstances like those exist-
ing in 1965.”286 These included the following: for seven covered states, 
blacks registered at a higher rate than the national average;287 in 
Texas, a higher registration rate for blacks (68.4) than for whites 
(61.5); in California, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tex-
as, a higher registration and turnout rate for blacks than for whites 
in the 2004 election;288 and significant increases in the numbers of 
Black elected officials, both nationally and in the six states originally 
covered under the Act.289
 Supporters of the Act must concede the force of this argument. If 
the Act was justified on the strength of “exceptional conditions,” how 
much leeway would Congress be granted to extend the legislation 
once these conditions begin to decline? To the NAMUDNO panel, 
however, this was an argument that it could easily dispose of: “in 
City of Rome, while acknowledging minority political progress since 
1965, the Court still accepted Congress’s judgment that extension of 
section 5’s preclearance requirement was ‘necessary . . . to promote 
further amelioration of voting discrimination.’ ”290 But this might be 
too easy. Consider the original argument from City of Rome in full: 
It must not be forgotten that in 1965, 95 years after ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment extended the right to vote to all citizens re-
gardless of race or color, Congress found that racial discrimination in 
voting was an “insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpe-
tuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and inge-
nious defiance of the Constitution.” In adopting the Voting Rights 
Act, Congress sought to remedy this century of obstruction by shift-
ing “the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the 
evil to its victims.” Ten years later, Congress found that a 7-year ex-
tension of the Act was necessary to preserve the “limited and fragile” 
achievements of the Act and to promote further amelioration of vot-
ing discrimination. When viewed in this light, Congress’ considered 
determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies 
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were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive 
voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable. The ex-
tension of the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of en-
forcing the Fifteenth Amendment.291
 In 1980, the Court could write that seven more years of coverage 
were justified in light of ninety-five years of evasion. Also, the 
achievements in 1975 were considered “limited and fragile,”292 and 
further amelioration of voting discrimination was needed. The ques-
tion for today is not whether City of Rome already decided this issue, 
but rather, how much evidence the Court would need in order to 
uphold the Act as a constitutional exercise of congressional powers. 
City of Rome only decided that in 1975, Congress could rationally 
reach such a determination on the facts then in existence. Whether 
the modern Court would similarly decide this question on the facts as 
they exist today was an entirely different question. The real question 
in NAMUDNO—to my mind the only question—was whether the Ro-
berts Court would approach the constitutionality of the Act in a simi-
larly deferential and modest posture. 
 The early signals from the Court were not promising. At oral ar-
gument, the conservative Justices made clear their misgivings about 
the constitutionality of the Act. Commentators generally assumed 
that the Act was in trouble.293
 But as could be predicted by the history of the Act, the Court 
evaded the constitutional question altogether.294 To be sure, the 
Court took the time to remind us about all the things that place the 
constitutionality of the Act in peril. For example: things have im-
proved;295 the Act departs radically from the “fundamental principle 
of equal sovereignty” among the states;296 the federalism concerns;297
and the fact that the rationality of the coverage formula has not 
changed for over thirty years.298 Mindful of all these things, the Court 
offered a reassuring note to those who count on the Justices to pro-
tect us from overreaching majorities: the Court was evading the con-
stitutional question, but this did not mean that the Court was 
shrinking from carrying out its traditional duties.299 Instead, the 
Court was only invoking its constitutional avoidance doctrine, which 
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counsels against deciding cases on constitutional grounds when there 
is “some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.”300
NAMUDNO would appear to be an uneventful, run-of-the-mill 
case. This is partially true. Yet NAMUDNO is a case of far greater 
import, and its real story lies elsewhere. At the heart of the case is 
not the fact that the Court avoided the constitutional inquiry, but 
how it strained the text of the statute and the intent of Congress in 
order to reach its desired conclusion. In other words, the real story of 
NAMUDNO is how far the Court was willing to go to do, in the end, 
what it has always done. The next Section situates the case within 
the larger history of the Act. 
B.   On the Art of Reading Statutes to Reach a Desired Result 
 The Utility District pressed two alternative arguments to the 
Court.301 The first, and the big prize, sought a ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the Voting Rights Act. Commentators and pundits alike 
braced for the worst, but the Court refused to take that step, siding 
instead with the District on its second argument: that under the bai-
lout provisions of the Act, the District should be allowed to break free 
from the demands of the statute once and for all.302 This was a sur-
prising conclusion to many. For example, a news account of the oral 
argument explained the questioning as follows:  
Gregory S. Coleman, a lawyer for the district, began his argument 
with a relatively modest request — that the district be allowed to 
“bail out” of Section 5 coverage. 
But the possibility of a ruling on that or another narrow ground 
did not seem to attract much interest from the justices.303
The moment we had all been waiting for was finally here, the main 
attraction. We would know once and for all whether the federalism 
revolution had enough traction to bring down the crown jewel of the 
civil rights movement. The conventional wisdom posited the Justices 
as intent on striking down the Act once and for all. 
 Instead, the Court stuck to its old script. That it set aside the con-
stitutional issue for another day should not be surprising; anyone 
paying attention to the history of the Act could have surmised as 
much. The surprising move appears to be in the execution: put as 
charitably as possible, the Court interpreted the bailout language in 
question to the limits of plausible statutory construction, far beyond 
anything the text said or Congress might have intended. The Court 
wanted to be rid of this case, and eight Justices agreed on a way to do 
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so. In so doing, this aspect of NAMUDNO also fits squarely within 
the history of the Act. 
 The bailout question did not appear difficult. In order for the Dis-
trict to be able to apply for bailout, it must be considered either a 
state or a political subdivision under the Act.304 The District was 
clearly not a state, so the case hinged on whether the District could 
be considered a “political subdivision covered ‘as a separate unit.’ ”305
Under the terms of the statute, a political subdivision is “ ‘any county 
or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted 
under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include 
any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for vot-
ing.’ ”306 On these terms, the lower court in NAMUDNO concluded 
that the District could not be considered a political subdivision under 
the Act and thus denied its request to bailout.307 That court based 
this decision on the language of the statute, the legislative history, 
and established regulations from the Attorney General.308
 In light of these arguments, commentators believed that the bai-
lout argument would not go far.309 They were wrong—and by a wide 
margin. In its 8-1 opinion, the Court sided with the District on its 
statutory claim, concluding that the District may in fact pursue the 
bailout option.310 Tellingly, the Court did not discuss the textual ar-
gument offered by the lower court, nor did it look to the legislative 
history of the regulations by the Attorney General. These materials 
strongly suggested that the District could not bail out, as only states 
or political subdivisions (as the term is defined by section 14(c)(2) of 
the statute) could do so. But these were only minor inconveniences, 
which the Court easily cast aside. Instead, the Court looked to dicta 
from a prior case, as well as “the structure of the Voting Rights Act” 
and the “underlying constitutional concerns,” all of which together 
“compel a broader reading” of the statute.311
 I could offer a detailed examination of the Court’s construction of 
the bailout provision in NAMUDNO, but to do so would be to mislead 
the reader. Consider in this vein the following analysis by Justice 
Scalia and compare it with the Court’s opinion not only in 
NAMUDNO but in just about every case where the Court has inter-
preted the language of the Act: 
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The starting point of the analysis [was] Supreme Court cases, and 
the new issue [was] presumptively decided according to the logic 
that those cases expressed, with no regard for how far that logic, 
thus extended, has distanced us from the original text and under-
standing. Worse still, however, it is known and understood that if 
that logic fails to produce what in the view of the current Supreme 
Court is the desirable result for the case at hand, then, like good 
common-law judges, the Court will distinguish its precedents, or 
narrow them, or if all else fails overrule them, in order that the 
Constitution might mean what it ought to mean.312
Justice Scalia has in mind constitutional cases, but the logic applies 
with equal force to statutory cases as well. In fact, it fits almost per-
fectly. That the author of the preceding passage is none other than 
Justice Scalia makes the argument particularly poignant and deli-
ciously ironic.  
 The real lesson of NAMUDNO lies precisely here. The details of 
the case are ultimately unimportant. Of far greater import is the fact 
that this case fits squarely within a tradition of deference to Con-
gress on constitutional questions and creative decisionmaking on 
questions of statutory interpretation. This case is thus a replay of the 
Katzenbach cases and Bossier Parrish, Beer, City of Rome, and Mon-
terey County. To focus too much attention on the interpretive ques-
tions at the heart of the case is to miss the real lessons of the Voting 
Rights Act in court. It is to these lessons that the next Part turns. 
VI.   MAKING SENSE OF THE ACT
 In the aftermath of the NAMUDNO case, election law scholars 
will find much to write about and criticize from the decision. Un-
doubtedly, they will be right. But in focusing too much attention on 
the case, they will miss the larger lessons and insights of the evolu-
tion of the Voting Rights Act. This Part focuses on these lessons and 
insights. More specifically, it examines the paradox at the heart of 
the Supreme Court’s handling of the Voting Rights Act. 
 Consider first the role of the federal courts in our constitutional 
universe. For questions of constitutional law, the courts are guar-
dians of the document, its text, and its spirit. The standard citation 
is Chief Justice Marshall’s Marbury opinion and in particular the fol-
lowing oft-cited passage: “It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to fay [sic] what the law is.”313 As a matter of 
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first principles, they need not defer to anyone, and their conclusions 
are not subject to any kind of review.  
 To be sure, this view of the federal judiciary has been the subject 
of criticism and important counter-stories from the time of the found-
ing; this is an old debate,314 and I do not mean to suggest otherwise. 
But this is a debate with a clear winner: the judiciary has the sole 
authority to interpret and defend the Constitution. Judicial supre-
macy—“the notion that judges have the last word when it comes  
to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine 
the meaning of the Constitution for everyone”315—has “become  
the norm.”316
 In contrast, statutes clearly belong to the legislatures, and the 
role of the courts in interpreting these texts is far more circum-
scribed and narrow. Here, the courts must seek to understand the 
text as its authors understood it, with an eye toward carrying out the 
wishes—the intent, perhaps?—of the authoring body. Whether a tex-
tualist,317 an intentionalist,318 a purposivist,319 or even a dynamic in-
                                                                                                                    
say what the law is”); cf. [sic] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (Supreme 
Court is “ultimate interpreter of the Constitution”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1, 18 (1958) (“permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional sys-
tem” is that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution”). 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922-23 (1995). 
 314. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Robert C. 
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions 
on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). For recent accounts that allocate interpretive 
responsibilities to other branches, see, for example, Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Depart-
mentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous 
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
 315. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 125 (2004). 
 316. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 964 
(2004); see Rachael E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 302 (2002) (ar-
guing that “the unmistakable trend is toward a view that all constitutional questions are 
matters for independent judicial interpretation and that Congress has no special institu-
tional advantage in answering aspects of particular questions” and that “[t]he Court has 
therefore become increasingly immodest when it comes to deciding how constitutional in-
terpretive power should be allocated”). For a response, see Robert Post & Reva Siegel,  
Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1027 (2004). 
 317. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 23; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983). 
 318. See Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a 
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, The Com-
mon Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1985); Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 
817 (1983). 
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terpretivist,320 a judge engaged in legislative interpretation must  
try to remain faithful—or at least pretend to be—to the legislative 
work product. Unlike constitutional interpretation where the docu-
ment belongs to the Court, statutes ultimately belong to the legisla-
ture. Statutory interpretation is an arena where legislatures  
reign supreme.321
 The history of the Voting Rights Act turns this familiar script on 
its head. This is an area where questions of constitutional law meet 
little resistance from the Justices, yet questions of statutory inter-
pretation meet an aggressive and creative Court. With the recent ex-
tension and amendments to the Voting Rights Act in 2006,322 this pa-
radox takes on renewed interest. This Part considers this puzzle in 
two Sections. The first Section understands the paradox as an exer-
cise in living constitutionalism. In case any doubts remained, this 
Section argues that progressive scholars and jurists do not have a 
monopoly on “activist” jurisprudence. 
 The second Section examines and tries to make sense of the few 
congressional responses to the Court’s creative interpretations of the 
statute. As the Court gives Congress a free pass to enact and extend 
the Act into the unforeseeable future, yet rewrites the text of the Act 
to its liking, how to explain the inconsistent congressional responses? 
Insights from positive political theory help frame an answer yet only 
deepen the puzzle. Before concluding, I offer a theory of my own. 
A.   Explaining the Paradox as an Exercise  
in Living Constitutionalism 
 One answer to the paradox at the heart of the Voting Rights Act 
lies implicit within the larger debate in constitutional law over the 
concept of judicial supremacy. When the Court subjects the Act to 
barely any scrutiny at all, it would appear that it offers Congress a 
free pass in this most sensitive area. But as the Court gives with one 
hand, it takes with the other. This is because Congress can never be 
                                                                                                                    
 319. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William A. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 250-51 (1986). 
 320. See William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479 (1987) (arguing that statutes “should—like the Constitution and the common 
law—be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, political, and 
legal context”). 
 321. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L.J. 281, 281 (1989) (“It is a commonplace that, apart from constitutional issues, 
judges are subordinate to legislatures in the making of public policy.”). 
 322. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 577, 
580-81 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (West Supp. 2007)). 
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sure that the Court will give its words their intended meaning. In 
other words, the Act means whatever the Court says it means, irres-
pective of congressional intent or even the language of the statute. 
Seen this way, the story of the Act in Court is but an installment of 
the larger story of the Court as judicially supreme. In fact, it is even 
better. It is one thing to tell Congress and the President where the 
limits of their powers are. It is quite another to do the work of the 
policy branches for them—this is judicial activism on steroids. 
 This Section explores with greater depth a second answer. This is 
a story where Congress accepts the role of the Court as constitutional 
interpreter and which portrays the Constitution as a living docu-
ment. It is also a story that turns the conventional wisdom on its head. 
 Begin with the debate in Congress in 1965. Note first that Con-
gress knew the extent of the problem and how difficult it was to tai-
lor an effective solution, as seen by its previous efforts in 1957, 1960, 
and 1964. Note also that as far as Congress was concerned, this was 
not a question of unavailability of power, because Congress was con-
fident that it had the power under the Fifteenth Amendment to do 
something about this problem. So the real question for Congress was 
how far the substantive provisions of the bill could go. 
 Out of concern for overstepping constitutional bounds, the admin-
istration and members of Congress drafted a broad statute, short on 
specifics and as far-reaching as they deemed constitutionally possi-
ble. In response to a question from Representative Cramer, for ex-
ample, Attorney General Katzenbach explained: “If the Congressman 
can suggest an effective means that covers everything that is covered 
by this act and can cover other areas and still be constitutional, I am 
sure that the administration would be most happy to consider that. 
We don’t want discrimination anywhere.”323 The Attorney General 
repeated this position often. The broad contours of the Act were 
clear: to eliminate the “blight of racial discrimination in voting.”324
Some witnesses and members of Congress wished for the bill to as-
sert far more directly the reach of the Act,325 but the legislation ulti-
mately failed to reflect these efforts. The language remained broad 
and expansive, which offered a willing interpreter room to expand 
the scope of the statute as necessary.  
 More tellingly, the language offered the Court the means through 
which to interpret section 5—and the Voting Rights Act in general—
expansively, up to the constitutional limits as the Court itself un-
derstood them. This is precisely what Congress intended: to tackle 
                                                                                                                    
 323. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 90. 
 324. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 325. See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 192 (objecting to Senator Fong’s 
suggestion to clarify the original section 9(a) of the Act). 
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the problem aggressively, decisively, yet within traditional constitu-
tional limits. This is a constitutional partnership in its truest sense, 
with Congress, the executive branch, and the Court working together 
in furthering voting rights policy. This is also a story of institutional 
trust. Congress implicitly ceded to the Court some policy-making au-
thority, trusting that the Court would further the work of Congress, 
rather than thwart it. 
 To be fair, direct evidence for this conclusion is scarce in the early 
legislative history, for Congress could not even be sure whether the 
constitutionality of the Act would bear judicial scrutiny—although 
Attorney General Katzenbach was very optimistic on this score.326
But Congress and the administration did make clear, time and again, 
that they wished to take the substantive provisions of the Act as far 
as constitutionally possible. After three recent attempts had failed to 
deliver much change, they wished to attack the problem as aggres-
sively and decisively as the Constitution permitted. The Court could 
thus interpret the Act as broadly as it wished, confident in the view 
that Congress would support its interpretation. Ironically, the tem-
porary nature of the special provisions of the Act proved helpful on 
this score, as Congress had many opportunities to comment on—and 
demonstrate approval for—the Court’s handiwork. Hence, the strate-
gy played out across decades and the various extensions of the Act.  
 The congressional response to Allen is particularly instructive. 
Consider, for example, the words of Representative McCulloch, of-
fered during the 1969 hearings: 
Section 5 was intended to prevent the use of most of these devices. 
But apparently the States rarely obeyed the mandate of that sec-
tion, and the Federal Government was too timid in its enforce-
ment. I hope that the case of Allen v. State Board of Elections,
decided by the Supreme Court on March 3, 1969, is the portent  
of change.327
Representative McCulloch was the House minority leader and a lead-
ing voice during the 1969 debates exhorting the federal government 
to do more while looking to Allen for approval. Clearly, the minority 
leader understood section 5 as a broad and necessary provision.328
                                                                                                                    
 326. See id. at 249 (“I think if anything [his opinion about the constitutionality of the 
bill] has been strengthened, Senator, because under such rigorous and learned cross ex-
amination as I have had on this point, my convictions remain the same, and I have confi-
dence in the constitutionality of the bill.”). 
 327. Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R. 5538, and Similar Pro-
posals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 4 (1969). 
 328. Id. at 270 (“Section 5 must not be repealed or emasculated. The past 4 years have 
proved that there are hundreds of ways to discriminate. Section 4 deals with literacy tests 
or devices. Section 5 deals with all of the rest . . . .”). 
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Far more tellingly, he remarked that thanks to Allen, “at long last af-
ter 4 years section 5 will become effective.”329
 Representative McCulloch was hardly alone. Important in this re-
gard is the way in which members of Congress referred to Allen and 
Gaston County during the 1969 hearings. Aside from critics such as 
Senator Ervin, who pointed to these cases as further proof that the 
sunset provisions of the Act should be allowed to expire, supporters 
of the Act referred to these decisions as part and parcel of the new 
statutory regime. More crucially, supporters of the Act made argu-
ments and staked positions during the 1969 hearings that made use 
of Allen and Gaston County as both accepted and crucial components 
of the legislation. It is also important for this argument that talk of 
overturning these decisions was close to nonexistent. That Congress 
held scheduled hearings so close to these decisions yet chose not to 
overturn them speaks volumes about the way in which Congress un-
derstood and ultimately accepted these cases as consonant with the 
mission of the Act.330
 During the 1975 hearings, the debate over the Court’s expansive 
interpretations of the Act was both subdued and altogether different. 
As in previous hearings, some witnesses offered unqualified support 
for the Court and its interpretations of the Act.331 There were also 
criticisms, of course, but by this time the critics were far more fo-
cused and pointed in their choice of targets. They knew that fighting 
the Act or their judicial interpretations on the merits would prove 
hopeless. They still criticized the Court, to be sure, but while doing 
so, they also asked Congress for guidance and much-needed clarity in 
the field. This muddiness was a problem, argued Daniel McLeod, 
South Carolina’s Attorney General, because “it is very difficult and a 
                                                                                                                    
 329. Id. at 271. The Civil Rights Commission took a similar view. A Staff memorandum 
dated July 8, 1969 argued that “until the Allen decision, referred to previously, it had been 
unclear whether Section 5 applied to all election law changes in the covered States, or only 
to those changes which dealt with voting and registration.” 1969 Senate Hearings, supra
note 21, at 52. “Because the Court has now made clear that Section 5 has a very wide 
scope,” the memo continued, “States can now be expected to submit more statutes for ap-
proval.” Id.
 330. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973) (“Had Congress disagreed 
with the interpretation of s 5 in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. Af-
ter extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which 
the Allen case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any 
substantive modification of s 5.” (footnote omitted)). See also Justice Thomas’ intriguing 
concurrence in Holder. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 929 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(conceding that Congress had interpreted section 5 expansively in Allen “and Congress has 
reenacted § 5 subsequent to our decisions adopting that expansive interpretation”). 
 331. See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 35, at 641 (statement of Armand Derf-
ner) (“The significance of section 5 did not become apparent until 1969, when the Supreme 
Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections clearly stated that this section covers changes 
that dilute black citizens’ votes as well as simpler devices of disenfranchisement.”); id. at 
717 (statement of Parker) (“I do not want to leave the impression that the court, in the Al-
len case, enunciated something which the Congress did not intend.”). 
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very onerous burden with the uncertainties brought into the picture 
by reason of the application of the act to know which acts should be 
submitted.”332 In this vein, Stone Barefield, a state representative 
from Mississippi, similarly complained that the courts have inter-
preted the Act far beyond the intent of Congress and “so that I, as a 
legislator, and so that other legislators in the affected States will 
know, pleased [sic] write into the Voting Rights Act by definition 
what Congress intends to cover by standard practice and procedure[].”333
 For my purposes, the most interesting and perhaps most impor-
tant testimony was that of Representative David Satterfield, a con-
gressman from the Commonwealth of Virginia. He clearly took issue 
with the courts and their interpretations and applications of the sta-
tute. Yet Congress was not powerless in the face of a runaway judi-
cial system, he complained, for these were largely questions of statu-
tory interpretation. And so he argued: 
I consider it unfortunate that the act has been construed by the 
courts to mean what they say it means. I believe it is time now for 
Congress, by specific amendments to make clear its position and 
its precise objectives, especially with regard to those court deci-
sions which have interpreted the act. There is an opportunity now, 
which should be seized, for Congress to make it clear whether it 
agrees with court interpretations and where it does not to make 
clear what it does mean to say by this act. I hope this committee 
will render special attention to this opportunity.334
Minutes later, he repeated his request: “Frankly, I have difficulty in 
finding in this act or the act’s legislative history the basis on which 
the courts are making that decision. It would be my hope that this 
subcommittee will address that point.”335 To which Representative 
Don Edwards, the chair of the subcommittee, responded, “Well, we 
will address that point.”336
 But they didn’t. Representative Satterfield issued his request on 
March 21st, and the committee published its report approximately 
six weeks later, on May 8th.337 And curiously, not a word was written 
on this issue. Instead, the report extended an approving nod toward 
the Court and its interpretations of the Act, as it cited both Allen and 
                                                                                                                    
 332. Id. at 581. 
 333. Id. at 707; see id. at 714 (“And that is why I have asked this committee to seriously 
consider defining these standards, the practices and procedures that we are dealing with.”). 
 334. Id. at 730; see id. at 737 (explaining that the crux of the matter for him was 
“whether or not the decisions of the courts, which to my mind have converted the objective 
of this act from one to guarantee that there not be a denial of the right to vote, and not to 
abridge the right to vote, to an enlargement to say that you can not dilute the effectiveness 
of that vote”). 
 335. Id.
 336. Id.
 337. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-196 (1975). 
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Perkins while explaining that around the time of the 1970 amend-
ments to the Act, the Court “gave broad interpretations to the scope 
of section 5.”338 It is clear that the House was fully aware of the 
Court’s broad interpretations of the statute yet uninterested in ca-
bining them. So long as their views were in harmony, Congress need 
not pay careful attention to the Court’s interpretations of the Act, no 
matter how inventive or creative these might be. 
 Now move the story ahead, from the City of Mobile decision in 
1980 and the wrongful redistricting cases of the 1990s to Bossier Pa-
rish and Georgia v. Ashcroft. These cases appear to break with the 
story of the Act presented here of a Congress wishing for the Court to 
interpret the Act broadly—to the constitutional limit—and of a Court 
willing to do exactly that. These cases narrowed the previous inter-
pretations of the statute to varying degrees. The break began in the 
mid-1970s, with City of Richmond v. United States and Beer v. Unit-
ed States. After these cases, the partnership between the Court and 
the political branches—and the broad judicial interpretations of the 
Act—largely ended. How to understand this shift? 
 For an answer, go back to my reading of the early history of the 
Act. In these cases, from Katzenbach and Morgan to Allen and Gas-
ton County, the Court takes its cues from Congress and extends the 
scope of the Act to the outer reaches of the law, as far as the Consti-
tution permits. One way to understand the shift in posture only re-
quires a different reading of the constitutional boundaries as then 
understood by the Court. In other words, it only requires a view of 
the Constitution as a changing and evolving document. This is a 
view, more precisely yet, of a “living Constitution.” 
 According to Justice Scalia, the argument proceeds as follows: 
“The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the ex-
istence of what is called The Living Constitution, a body of law that 
(unlike normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order 
to meet the needs of a changing society.”339 The “living Constitution” 
argument is an argument for the Constitution as a changing and 
flexible document, adaptable to changing times and circumstances. 
This is an argument that places the Justices at the center of this 
change, able to discern it and willing to interpret the Constitution in 
ways that accommodate it. 
                                                                                                                    
 338. Id. at 9. 
 339. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 38; see Melissa McNamara, Scalia Raps ‘Living Constitu-
tion,’ CBS NEWS.COM, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/14/supremecourt/ 
main1315619.shtml (“ ‘That’s the argument of flexibility and it goes something like this: 
The Constitution is over 200 years old and societies change. It has to change with society, 
like a living organism, or it will become brittle and break.’ ‘But you would have to be an 
idiot to believe that.’ Scalia said. ‘The Constitution is not a living organism; it is a legal 
document. It says something and doesn’t say other things.’ ”). 
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 To Justice Scalia, however, change and flexibility must come from 
sources outside the Court: “If you think aficionados of a living Consti-
tution want to bring you flexibility, think again . . . . You think the 
death penalty is a good idea? Persuade your fellow citizens to adopt 
it. You want a right to abortion? Persuade your fellow citizens and 
enact it. That’s flexibility.”340 In other words, the Constitution does 
not change outside the amendment process and it is not up to the 
Justices to adapt it as their policy views see fit. 
 But life is never quite so simple. The Voting Rights Act offers an 
apt example. One way to understand the early cases, from Katzen-
bach and Morgan to Allen and Gaston County, is precisely as I sug-
gested earlier: the Court takes its cues from Congress and extends 
the scope of the Act to the outer reaches of the law, as far as the Con-
stitution permits. Beginning with the City of Richmond341 decision in 
1975, the Court’s readings are much less constricted and inflexible. 
This posture continues throughout the life of the Act. Beer and the 
Bossier Parish cases serve as bookends. 
 To give the Court its due, it may be said that the Court is still 
faithful to the original congressional directive; that is, the Court is 
still interpreting the Act to the outer reaches of the Constitution. It 
just so happens that these outer limits are far narrower than they 
might have been. Or as the Court wrote in Bossier Parish II: to in-
terpret section 5 of the Act as appellants contend “would also exacer-
bate the ‘substantial’ federalism costs that the preclearance proce-
dure already exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 
5’s constitutionality.”342 As I suggested earlier, the conclusion that 
section 5 does not reach discriminatory yet nonretrogressive dilutive 
purposes would be unthinkable for the Warren Court, or, worse yet, 
for the 89th Congress, or the 91st Congress, or the 94th Congress. 
But this is not the same Constitution that we are expounding. One 
way to understand the Court’s narrow interpretations of the Act is to 
recognize that the Constitution changes and the Court’s interpreta-
tions have necessarily changed with it. That is to say, the Constitu-
tion might be alive after all, even for the conservative justices. 
B.   On the Look of a Strategic Court
 The Court’s interpretations of the Act raise a second puzzle. It 
stands to reason that if the Justices wish for their preferred policies 
to endure, they must take into account the preferences of other insti-
                                                                                                                    
 340. Scalia Slams “Living Constitution” Theory, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14, 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,150428,00.html. 
 341. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975). 
 342. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (citing Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 
U.S. 266, 282 (1999); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995)). 
2009] PARADOXICAL CASE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 757 
tutions. This proposition is particularly important for questions of 
statutory interpretation, where the risk of congressional override is 
at its highest. But the evolution of the Voting Rights Act appears to 
defy this theory. From the time the Court first interpreted the lan-
guage of the statute in Allen, its decisions have been eclectic and cre-
ative implementations of the intent of Congress and the language of 
the statute. These interpretations do not appear to follow a discerni-
ble pattern in terms of congressional response; while some holdings 
have met much resistance from Congress, others have not. This final 
Section examines this relationship.  
 The theory itself is easily stated, in the form of a game between 
Congress, the Court, the President, and congressional committees, 
acting within a range of policy choices.343 The Court begins the game 
by identifying its preferred policy position. It then considers the 
range of policy alternatives that might be acceptable to Congress and 
the President. When the Court’s identified position is outside this 
range, it presumes that its preferred position risks reversal from 
Congress and the President. The Court seeks to avoid this override 
by shifting its preferred position within the range acceptable to Con-
gress and the President. 
 The civil rights era, from 1967 to 1990, provides a strong example 
of this model.344 From 1966 to 1971, the Court was to the left of Con-
gress on civil rights questions.345 The relevant committees—labor and 
judiciary—were to the right of the Court but to the left of Congress 
as a whole.346 On this configuration, the Court was truly independent 
and did not need to fear a congressional override, because both the 
President and the committees supported the views of the Court.347
Any legislation trying to overrule the Court had little chance of be-
coming law, because the congressional committees would not bring 
such legislation to the floor, and if this hurdle were overcome, the 
President stood ready to veto it.348
 This is a way to understand Allen v. State Board of Elections, a 
case that offered a very aggressive application of the work of Con-
gress and particularly Section 5. Allen had its share of critics. But 
                                                                                                                    
 343. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Supreme Court Statutory Inter-
pretation]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Es-
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 344. See Eskridge, Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation, supra note 343, at 391-97. 
 345. Id. at 391-92. 
 346. Id.
 347. Id.
 348. See id.
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the picture that emerges from the 1969 hearings is that of a thankful 
Congress, happy to see the Court interpret the statutes in ways that 
Congress could not even foresee in 1965. Committee members were 
on the side of the Court, and the full Congress followed the commit-
tee’s lead, extending the statute for another five years while refusing 
to take on the Court’s expansive interpretations.349 Following Allen,
the Court extended its teachings aggressively, with the apparent 
blessings of Congress in 1970.  
 The period between 1972 and 1986 witnessed a marked change in 
the game.350 New appointments to the Court in 1975, 1981, and 1986 
moved the Court sharply to the right at a time when Congress was 
moving to the left.351 According to Professor Eskridge, this shift 
should lead to a policy tension between Congress and the Court, as 
the Court would no longer enjoy the protection of supportive congres-
sional committees.352 The Court must predict where the current con-
gressional preferences carefully lie; a misstep could lead to an imme-
diate override. 
 The model only partially explains the Voting Rights Act cases. 
The Court’s move to the right is clear enough; it began in 1975 with 
City of Richmond. But the tension predicted by the model never sur-
faced, as the congressional response remained muted. The Court re-
mained in charge of delineating the contours of the statute while 
Congress happily acquiesced. 
 The next case, Beer v. United States,353 might have appeared to 
change all of this. The timeline raises a few skeptical eyebrows. The 
case was first argued on March 26, 1975,354 at which time Congress 
was debating whether to extend the Act once more. The Court set the 
case for reargument, which took place on November 12th.355 In so 
doing, the Court’s decision came after the President signed the bill on 
August 6th.356 The Court ultimately decided the case on March 30, 
1976, at which time the retrogression standard first surfaced. Nota-
bly, the 94th Congress did not take on the Court and any of its ag-
gressive interpretations, choosing instead to extend the Act for seven 
years while adding the language provisions to the statute. The retro-
gression standard remained law as consonant with the intent of Con-
gress. It remains so to this day. 
                                                                                                                    
 349. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat.  
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 There is much to criticize about the Beer decision, and I did so 
previously. For my purposes here, it is notable that Congress did not 
take on the Court and its narrow interpretations of the Act. The ten-
sion predicted by the model never surfaced. To be fair, the City of 
Richmond was argued in April and decided in June, giving Congress 
very little time to respond to the Court. The 1975 hearings were 
winding down and Congress had more pressing matters to attend. In 
contrast, we should expect some kind of response after Beer, a deci-
sion where the Court radically altered the law. But Congress did no 
such thing. Thus begging the question: after Beer, how could the 
Court view itself as anything but safe from congressional override? If 
Beer did not provoke a response from Congress during the 1982 de-
bates, what would? 
 Four years later, Congress gave us an answer. In 1980, the Court 
decided City of Mobile v. Bolden,357 which concluded that Section 2 of 
the Act incorporated the constitutional intent standard.358 This case 
marked a watershed in the history of the Act, as Congress over-
turned this holding when extending the Act for another twenty-five 
years in 1982.359 This override is hard to explain in light of what 
came before. To Professor Eskridge, the override fits the game as he 
describes it: after 1972, increased tension between a right-of-center 
Court and a more liberal Congress led to increased overrides from 
Congress.360 But how to explain a lack of an override, or even a debate 
in Congress, over the Beer holding, but an override of City of Mobile at 
a time when, as Eskridge points out, a more conservative Presidency 
offered the Court more leeway to reach conservative results?361
 Deepening the puzzle, it is notable that after City of Mobile, the 
Court did not alter its approach to the statute in any way, continuing 
to interpret the statute the way it always had: creatively, even dy-
namically. Yet Congress proved uninterested once again. Whether it 
was Thornburg v. Gingles,362 where the Court interpreted the newly 
amended Section 2 as concomitant with the intent of Congress;363
Presley v. Etowah County Commission,364 where the Court offered a 
narrow interpretation of the scope of Section 5; or Bossier Parrish I,
where the Court uncoupled section 2 of the Act from the Section 5 re-
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trogression inquiry,365 Congress did not take on the Court in any way. 
It simply did not care. 
 A final twist to this story came at the close of the decade and the 
beginning of the next, when the Court decided both Bossier Parish 
II366 and Georgia v. Ashcroft.367 If the past held to form, the Court had 
nothing to worry about and Congress would leave both opinions un-
disturbed. Instead, Congress overrode both decisions during its most 
recent extension of the Act in 2006.368
 This short history raises important questions about the Court and 
its interactions with Congress and the President. The remainder of 
this Section focuses on one question in particular: how to explain 
these responses to the Court’s work, in light of those moments when 
Congress chooses not to respond? This important question deserves 
more time and attention than I can give it here. This Section 
sketches an answer. 
 The story of the Voting Rights Act is a story of social movements 
and interest group politics, of evolution and gradual change, and of 
the Court as a member of the national policy-making coalition. It is a 
story of congressional power and federalism, of race and resistance, 
of voting and trust. Ultimately, it is a story where national majorities 
get their way. 
 The Voting Rights Act was the fourth attempt within eight years 
to address the problem of race and voting in select jurisdictions. In 
light of these prior efforts, the Act and its extreme and radical provi-
sions can only make sense as a byproduct of the civil rights move-
ment, as a result of Bloody Sunday and the resulting press cover-
age.369 It was time. 
 Once the expected challenge to the constitutionality of the Act 
reached the Court on direct appeal, the institution responded as a 
member of the national coalition would be expected to respond. The 
Court in the Katzenbach cases deferred to Congress and the execu-
tive branch, and in so doing, it signaled its willingness to do its part 
in solving the problem of racial discrimination in voting. Katzenbach 
v. Morgan is particularly instructive, as existing law offered no 
match for the Court’s willingness to offer Congress what amounted to 
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a free pass in this area. Allen and its progeny offer further proof for 
this thesis. As the problems changed and the affected jurisdictions 
adapted, the Court was up to the task, filling the needed statutory 
gaps and expanding the Act as needed. And Congress was only too 
happy for the help. 
 New appointments by the Nixon administration began to turn the 
tide, so that by 1975 the Court for the first time interpreted the lan-
guage of the statute narrowly. This was the City of Richmond case. It 
was also Beer and City of Mobile. Once this shift took place, absent a 
few outliers, the Court was no longer doing the work of Congress. 
The 1960s coalition was no longer in charge, and the Court’s inter-
pretations of the Act reflected this change. With a new coalition in 
place, the question then was whether the Act would remain a consti-
tutional exercise of congressional powers under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. The congressional debates in 1982 and 2006 must be 
understood in this context. 
 Once the Court broke away from the original, expansive promise 
of the Act, the congressional responses to the Court are nothing more 
than clear substantive disagreements about policy. In other words, 
these responses are nothing but a display of Congress asserting its 
will in matters of statutory interpretation. But more tellingly, this is 
a story of interest group politics and the role played by the civil 
rights lobby in support of the Act.370 The early years of the Act saw 
the Court on the side of the coalition, and so the debates were sub-
dued and altogether different. There was no need to respond to the 
Court and its interpretations. Once the Court shifted ground and 
moved away from its earlier self, the coalition responded in kind the 
first time it had the chance—in 1982. The same dynamic occurred  
in 2006.  
 In order to make sense of the Act, then, we must take the longer 
view. The Court has offered creative and even radical interpretations 
of the language of the statute from the moment it first confronted the 
Act in the late 1960s. Congressional responses, in the form of over-
ride legislation, have only surfaced sporadically—namely, in 1982 
and 2006. This is hardly a coincidence. One of the main shortcomings 
of the theory of congressional overrides is the difficulties that inhere 
in enacting new legislation to override the Court. The structural bar-
riers are many and well known: 
“Since Congress itself is constrained by the Executive Branch and 
since institutional features of Congress such as its bicameral 
structure, the committee system, and even the subcommittee sys-
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tem, make it difficult for Congress to overturn a Supreme Court 
decision, legislative constraints provide the judiciary with a great 
deal of discretion. Because of the difficulty in forecasting electoral 
returns and in anticipating congressional action and because of the 
extensive set of veto points that exists in the legislative policy-
making process, Supreme Court justices need not always alter 
their behavior in anticipation of a congressional response.”371
To this list we may add both transaction and opportunity costs.372
Passing legislation to override judicial decisions takes time away 
from other activities that more directly benefit reelection efforts. Al-
so, enacting override legislation must take the place of enacting other 
types of legislation with higher salience among one’s constituents. 
Taken together, these barriers and costs suggest that the risk of 
override legislation will be quite low. 
 The Voting Rights Act overcomes this low risk of override through 
the sunset provision. Originally enacted as recognition of the radical 
nature of its special provisions and as a way to force Congress to re-
visit the need for these special provisions in the near future, the Act 
originally included a five-year limit on its coverage formula. This 
meant that Congress must return to this question in 1970 and con-
sider whether the gains during this period warranted letting the Act 
expire. One way to read the congressional debates in 2006 and the 
extension of the Act for another twenty-five years sees Congress as 
not yet satisfied that the voting rights gains of the last forty-one 
years warrant expiration of the coverage formula. This is a decision 
that Congress has made at select points in the history of the Act—in 
1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. This means that the sunset provision 
has offered Congress not only a way to review its own work at set in-
tervals, but to review the work of the Court as well. It is hardly coin-
cidental that Congress has chosen to override select judicial interpre-
tations in 1982 and 2006 and that these decisions came a few years 
before the sunset hearings were set to begin. More importantly,  
these sunset hearings offer all interested groups and coalitions  
a built-in opportunity to come to Congress and press for their pre-
ferred interpretations. 
 Assuming my argument is correct, a final question immediately 
arises. On the same day that the Court decided City of Mobile, it also 
decided City of Rome, which upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 
By this time, the Court had long split with the coalition that gave life 
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to the Act. If this story is correct, the constitutionality of the Act 
hung on the balance, and the judicial deference of old would surely 
give way to far more aggressive review. But City of Rome continued 
with the posture of deference. How to explain this case in light of the 
Court’s clear turn away from the goals of the Act? The answer lies 
within the chambers of Justices Blackmun and Stevens and Chief 
Justice Burger. They cast the crucial votes between the shift in the 
mid-1970s and 1980. The Chief Justice’s vote is particularly curious, 
because his record in civil rights cases was not terribly strong on the 
side of civil rights plaintiffs, nor did he shift gradually with time, as 
did Justices Blackmun and Stevens. A tentative answer is that the 
Chief Justice, while willing to tinker with the minutiae of voting 
rights law, proved unwilling to undo the most effective civil rights 
statute in history. It would not be said that the Burger Court struck 
down the Voting Rights Act. It remains to be seen whether Chief 
Justice Roberts will respond similarly. 
VII.   CONCLUSION
 The Voting Rights Act, the crown jewel of the civil rights move-
ment, is once again at the center of the debate over the political 
rights of voters of color. This is a debate about both the powers of 
Congress under the Reconstruction Amendments and the substantive 
voting rights of voters of color. Scholars are presently engaged in 
both strands of this debate. But as this Article argues, their efforts 
are ultimately misplaced. The Voting Rights Act is much too impor-
tant, and the Court’s rulings far too intriguing and paradoxical, to 
treat this case law as we treat all others. Rather than focus on the 
doctrinal nuances of both the statute and the Reconstruction 
Amendments, we must focus instead on the Court as a strategic in-
stitution and the Justices as “single-minded seekers of legal poli-
cy.”373 This is the only way, or so this Article argues, to make sense of 
the history of the Act. 
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